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Abstract 
 
The document similarity detection is an important technique used in many applications. The 
existence of the tool that guarantees the privacy protection of the documents during the comparison 
will expand the area where this technique can be applied. The goal of this project is to develop a 
method for privacy-preserving document similarity detection capable to identify either semantically 
or syntactically similar documents. As the result two methods were designed, implemented, and 
evaluated. In the first method privacy-preserving data comparison protocol was applied for secure 
comparison. This original protocol was created as a part of this thesis. In the second method 
modified private-matching scheme was used. In both methods the Natural Language processing 
techniques were utilized to capture the semantic relations between documents. During the testing 
phase the first method was found to be too slow for the practical application. The second method, 
on the contrary, was rather fast and effective. It can be used for creation of the tool for detecting 
syntactical and semantic similarity in a privacy-preserving way.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Thesis definition 
 
Privacy-preserving document similarity detection 
 
Group 13: Ksenia Khelik 
 
Detection of document similarity is an important problem with many applications in the areas of for 
instance plagiarism detection, copyright protection, file management, document searching etc. 
There can be distinguished two types of document similarity: syntactic and semantic one. The 
documents are syntactically similar if they are written with the same words. The documents are 
semantically similar if they contain the same information. Many tools have been developed for 
documents comparisons based both on semantic and syntactic analysis.  
In this project we consider the problem of privacy-preserving similarity detection of documents. 
Such solution is needed when users want to compare documents without disclosing them to each 
other. The privacy-preserving similarity detection implies existence of the secure protocol that 
protects document contexts from disclosing to the other side during the comparison. The goal of 
this master project is to design and implement such solution in order to create a tool that can be 
used for privacy-preserving document comparison. 
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1 Introduction 
The document similarity detection is used in many different applications, such as plagiarism 
detection, copyright protection and file management. A lot of methods are developed and many 
tools, i.e. [23], [24], [25], were created in order to effectively compare the documents, but only few 
of these methods ([6], [10], [14]) and none of tools can be applied to confidential document 
similarity detection. The handling of the documents of such type implies the comparison process is 
organized in such way that it guarantees the privacy protection of document contents.  The existing 
methods, satisfying this condition, reveal only the syntactically similar confidential documents. In 
this project it was attempted to develop a method which along with a syntactic similarity can also 
detect a semantic one in the privacy-preserving way.  
1.1 Background 
The document similarity detection is an important technique used in many applications. It can be 
applied to efficient data management, to detection of copyright violations and plagiarism. But only 
few of the existing methods and none of tools provide privacy protection of the documents they 
compare. Development of the method for privacy-preserving documents comparison enables to 
expand the area where document similarity detection can be applied. Some examples of privacy-
preserving similar document detection usage are given below. 
 
At first it can be used in universities to prevent plagiarism in project reports. Sometimes project can 
be given by the company. Working on such project, a student can get an access to some 
company’s confidential documents and use their parts in his or her report without references. The 
creation of a common database, consisting of companies’ documents, related to the project topics, 
can help to deal with this problem. The presence of a secure protocol for data transfer and 
comparison will provide documents confidentiality. At second, this technique can be applied to 
reveal duplicated conference registrations or paper submissions. Nowadays, there is no effective 
procedure to detect the paper that is submitted to obtain the permission for the author to participate 
in different conferences or to be published in different journals. Privacy-preserving document 
similarity detection enables to unite conference committees or journal redactors to find dishonest 
applicants. Thirdly, this tool can help the customers to decide whether or not they need to buy the 
chosen articles or books. In many online book shops there is no preview option available, so 
sometimes it is impossible to check if this article or book is the same one that the customer already 
has or how many changes the authors have made in their new editions as compared to the 
previous ones. Opportunities, the privacy-preserving document similarity detection provides, allows 
the customer to resolve doubts before buying without infringing the copyrights.  
 
It can be distinguished 4 kinds of document similarity: semantic, syntactic, lexical and structural one. 
In this project only semantic and syntactic similarities are taken into consideration. Two documents 
are syntactically similar if they are written with the same words placed in the same order. The 
documents are semantically similar if they contain the same information possibly written with 
different words. Unfortunately, it is not always enough to check only whether the documents are 
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syntactically similar. Very often different changes are applied to the document to hide the fact that 
this document is a copy of another one. The most widespread methods are: changing the order of 
words, sentences, paragraphs, using synonyms, paraphrasing the sentences, adding and/or 
deleting some parts. So in order to compare the documents correctly, it is also necessary to check 
the presence of semantic document similarity. The existence of the method, that detects both 
semantic and syntactic similarity and guarantees the privacy protection for the confidential 
documents, will improve the quality of document comparison and expand the area where document 
similarity detection can be applied. 
1.2 Problem statement 
Let Alice and Bob represent two parties each of whom has a collection of documents. The 
document is considered as a text, paragraph, sentence or just several distinct words. Both Alice’s 
and Bob’s documents are assumed to be confidential. The goal of this project is to develop a 
method that enables to detect whether or not Bob’s collection contains a document, similar to the 
some document from Alice’s collection without disclosing Bob’s data to Alice and vice-versa. This 
method should indentify either semantically or syntactically similar documents. 
 
The aim implies the creation of a secure protocol for privacy-preserving data comparison. This 
protocol should be design in such manner that it doesn’t require the presence of the trusted third 
party. 
1.3 Literature review 
Several approaches were proposed in order to detect the syntactically similar documents. One of 
the widely used methods is to introduce vector space model [1], [2], [3]. All words, met in both 
documents, form the global vector space. Then the individual vector for each document is created. 
This vector consists of elements representing how much times the words from global space 
appeared in the text. More common words the documents share, closer the vectors are. To find the 
distance between the vectors the cosine theorem [4] can be used. If the distance is greater than 
some pre-defined threshold, then the documents are considered to be similar.  
 
Some attempts were made to use vector space model for privacy-preserving document comparison. 
In [5] the authors proposed a method for similarity-based text retrieval that safeguard the content of 
the user queries and the retrieved documents. To provide the privacy the trusted third party was 
involved. In [6], [7] two different ways for privacy-preserving distance finding were described. The 
first one is based on random matrix-based privacy-preserving dot product protocol [8]. The second 
way is to employ the properties of homomorphic encryption. Both of these methods guarantee the 
privacy of the individual vectors and, consequently, the document contents.     
 
The comparison of the fingerprints is an alternative way to find a syntactical document similarity. 
The idea to map a text into a bit-string, called fingerprint, was introduced in [9] by M.O. Rubin. Later 
in [10] A. Z. Broder showed how Rubin’s fingerprints can be applied for similar document detection. 
Since then, some work has been done to optimize this approach. In [11] the attack-resistant 
9 
 
method for identifying plagiarized documents was presented. The security was provided by 
unpredictable fingerprint counting process. The algorithms, described in [12], [13], were able to 
detect near-duplicated documents. As fingerprints comparison doesn’t reveal the document 
contents to another party, it can be used for privacy-preserving similarity detection. 
 
One more approach, called private matching scheme, was described in [14]. It was created to find 
the intersection of private datasets of two parties. The method is based on the homomorphic 
encryption properties that are used for operation performed on polynomial whose roots are the 
dataset elements of one of the party. Unfortunately, this scheme doesn’t provide confidentiality to 
all elements in datasets, but can be easy modified to be applied to privacy-preserving document 
similarity detection. 
 
As for revealing semantic similarity in the documents, the usage of the natural language processing 
techniques is one of the effective ways to do it. In [15] it was proposed to parse the document to 
extract the distinct words, called tokens. The parsing process includes the removal of high 
frequency words and the stemming of the remaining words. The obtained sets of tokens are used 
for documents comparison. In [16] it was experimentally shown that it is enough to compare only 
nouns, adjectives and verbs to detect the semantic similarity of the documents. The authors of [17], 
[18] suggested to use the ontology, as it enables to reflect semantic relationship between 
documents and make comparison process more effective. The overview of all natural language 
processing techniques that can be used for semantic similarity detection is given in [19].  
1.4 Problem solution 
The analysis of the existing methods for different document similarity types detection showed there 
is no such method that reveals both semantically and syntactically similar documents in privacy-
preserving way. So it was decided to combine some found approaches to be able to do it. As the 
result two methods were developed. Both of these methods have the following structure. At first for 
all documents of each party the areas, the documents are related to, are found employing ontology. 
Then every document is processed, using Natural Languages Processing techniques, and 
transformed into a set of distinct meaningful words, called footprint.  After that footprint and areas of 
each document of one party are compared respectively with a footprint and areas of every 
document of another party in privacy-preserving way. In the first method privacy-preserving data 
comparison protocol, created as a part of this thesis, was employ for secure comparison. In the 
second method private matching scheme [14] was applied after some modifications for this purpose.  
For methods implementation Python programming language was used.  
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2 Theoretical background 
As it was mentioned in paragraph 1.4, two methods for privacy-preserving document similarity 
detection were developed. To create them, several approaches were used. They are Natural 
Language Processing techniques [19], private matching scheme [14], and privacy-preserving data 
comparison protocol. The description of these approaches is given in this chapter. 
2.1 Natural Language Processing 
 
Natural Language Processing (NLP) is a theoretically motivated range of computational techniques 
for analyzing and representing texts in natural human-languages [20]. All NLP systems aim to 
achieve a human-like performance during language processing. For this purpose they use different 
levels of linguistic analysis utilized by humans to produce or comprehend language. The following 
levels of linguistic analysis can be distinguished [20]: phonology, morphology, lexical, syntactic, 
semantic, discourse, and pragmatic one.  
 
Phonology level deals with the interpretation of speech sounds within and across words. The NLP 
systems analyze the sound waves and encoded them into a digitized signal for further processing. 
Morphology level analyzes the form and structure of words. All words are composed of the smallest 
units of meaning, called morphemes. Since the meaning of each morpheme remains the same 
across words, the NPL systems exploit this property to gain the meaning of the unknown words. At 
the lexical level the sentences are divided into separate words. The NLP system assigns the part-
of-speech tag to each word according to the context in which this word occurs and then determines 
its possible meanings. Syntactic level focuses on analyzing the words in a sentence in order to 
uncover the structural dependency between the words. The semantic level goal is to determine the 
meaning of the sentences based on the words meanings. This stage includes the semantic 
disambiguation of polysemous words. Discourse and pragmatic levels are the highest levels of 
processing. Discourse is focusing on finding of the connections between sentences. Pragmatic 
level is concentrated on the context over and above the text contents for better text understanding 
[20].  
 
The NLP techniques are used in many applications, such as information retrieval, text mining, 
language understanding, and text classification.  The description of the often-used techniques is 
given below. 
 
2.1.1 Natural Language Processing techniques 
 
Stop list 
Stop list contains high frequency words, such as ’of’, ‘a’, or ‘is’. Usually these words are ignored to 
improve the performance. But in some applications, i.e. text mining, they can help to determine a 
part of speech or to clarify the semantics of the text segment [19]. 
 
Stemming 
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Stemming is the process of reducing the word to its root. For example, ‘derives’ and ‘derivation’ can 
be replaced by ‘deriv’. It leads to the reducing of the number of meaningful words, but can also 
affect the semantics.  
 
Lemmatization  
Lemmatization is the process of reducing the word to its canonical form. For example, ‘is’, ’are’, and 
‘been’ will be replaced by ‘be’. As well as stemming, it leads to reducing the number of meaningful 
words, but make it in more proper way, using vocabulary and morphology analysis of the words [21]. 
 
Noisy data 
Noisy data refers to the words with spelling mistakes, acronyms and abbreviations. It can be very 
useful to correct all mistakes and to replace all acronyms and abbreviations at the beginning of 
analysis.  
 
Word sense disambiguation 
The word sense disambiguation problem is about finding out the most probable meaning of a 
polysemous word [19]. Several approaches can be used to deal with this problem: dictionary and 
knowledge based, supervised, and unsupervised methods. Dictionary and knowledge based 
methods suppose that the sense of the word can be extracted from definitions of the words, so they 
use dictionaries, thesauri and other lexical knowledge bases. Supervised methods mainly adopt 
context to disambiguate words. These methods include training and testing phases. In the training 
phase, a sense-annotated training corpus is required, from which syntactic and semantic features 
are extracted to create a classifier using machine learning techniques [22]. When lexical knowledge 
bases or training data are unavailable, the unsupervised methods are used. These methods 
acquire contextual information directly from unannotated raw text, and senses can be induced from 
text using some similarity measure [22].  
 
Part of speech tagging 
Part of speech (POS) tagging is a process of assigning a part of speech to each word in a sentence. 
It helps to determine the right word sense. There following basic POS tags are used by all taggers: 
verb, noun, pronoun, adjective, adverb, preposition, conjunction, and interjection with some taggers 
adding the article [16]. Many tagging systems extend these basic tags to describe additional 
grammatical features, such as singular/plural, number, tense, gender, and even punctuation [16]. 
 
Ontology 
Ontology is a knowledge structure that specified terms, their properties and relations among them 
to enable knowledge extraction from the text [18]. It consists of concept, concept-relations, axiom 
and instances [19].The selection of concepts depends on the task and the domain information that 
need to be captured. Thus before constructing the ontology, it is important to know what it will be 
used for. The ontology reflects the structure of the certain domain and clarifies the meaning of 
thespecial terms appeared in the text. Thus it can be used to provide expert, background 
knowledge about the domain and constrain the possible senses of the terms. The application of 
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ontology to the document comparison can reveal the semantic similarity that hasn’t been noticed 
before [18]. 
 
Tokenization 
Tokenization is the process of breaking up the sequence of characters in a text by locating the word 
boundaries, the points where one word ends and another begins [26]. The derived words are called 
tokens. Tokenization is rather easy task for the languages, like English, Russian, or German, in 
which words are separated by space character. But it can be complicated for Chinese and some 
other languages, because a word may be represented as a single character or series of several 
characters, and there may be no space between words [26].     
2.2 Private matching scheme 
Private matching (PM) scheme was proposed in [14] by B. Pinkas, M.J. Freedman and K. Nissim, 
to find the intersection of private datasets elements taken from the same domain. It is a two-party 
protocol based on the use of encryption function ܧ݊ܿ, satisfying following properties: 
 
(1)  Encryption function is a homomorphic function:  
Given two ciphertexts ܧ݊ܿሺ݉ଵሻ and ܧ݊ܿሺ݉ଶሻ, then ܧ݊ܿሺ݉ଵ ൅ ݉ଶሻ ൌ ܧ݊ܿሺ݉ଵሻ ْ ܧ݊ܿሺ݉ଶሻ, for some 
operation . 
 
(2) It allows multiplication by a constant: 
Given ciphertext ܧ݊ܿሺ݉ሻ and some constant ܿ, then it’s possible to compute ܧ݊ܿሺܿ · ݉ሻ, without 
decrypting ciphertext 
 
As an example of the encryption function, satisfying these properties, Paillier’s cryptosystem [27] 
can be taken. It is described in paragraph 2.2.2. 
 
2.2.1 Private matching scheme description 
Let Alice and Bob represent two parties. Alice’s input is a set ܺ ൌ ሼݔଵ, … , ݔேሽ from some domain, 
Bob’s input is a set Yൌ ሼݕଵ, … , ݕ௄ሽ  from the same domain. According to [14] protocol has the 
following basic structure. Alice defines a polynomial P, whose roots are her inputs: 
Pሺtሻ ൌ ሺxଵ െ tሻሺxଶ െ tሻ … ሺxN െ tሻ ൌ ෍ a୳t୳
N
୳ୀ଴
 
 
She sends to Bob encrypted coefficients of this polynomial. Bob employs the homomorphic 
properties of the encryption system to evaluate the polynomial at each of his inputs. Then he 
multiplies each result by a random number r, adds to it an encryption of the value of his input, to get 
 ܧ݊ܿሺݎଵ · ܲሺݕଵሻ ൅ ݕଵሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿሺݎ௄ · ܲሺݕ௄ሻ ൅ ݕ௄ሻ  and sends them to Alice. She decrypts received 
values and compares obtained values with her inputs. The result is a number of common elements 
and their values. Other decrypted values, not equal to some Alice’s element values, are just 
random numbers, and don’t reveal the corresponding Bob’s element values. The scheme is 
13 
 
organized in such way that Bob can’t know the Alice’s element values. The detailed protocol 
description is given Figure 1. 
 
Alice 
 
 Bob 
1. Choose the parameters for a 
homomorphic encryption 
function Enc 
 
 
Public parameters 
 
2. Define the polynomial P with 
roots ݔଵ, … , ݔே and coefficients   
ܽଵ, … , ܽே  
 
 
 
3. Encrypt coefficients, to get 
set  ሼܧ݊ܿሺܽ଴ሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿሺܽேሻሽ 
  
  
ሼܧ݊ܿሺܽ଴ሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿሺܽேሻሽ 
 
 
  For every Bob’s input y repeat steps 1-2:    
  1. Choose a random value r  
  2. compute ܧ݊ܿሺݎ · ܲሺݕሻ ൅ ݕሻ  
  
3. randomly permute  
ܧ݊ܿሺݎଵ · ܲሺݕଵሻ ൅ ݕଵሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿሺݎ௄ ·
ܲݕܭ൅ݕܭ to get  
ܧ݊ܿሺݎଵ · ܲሺݕଵԢሻ ൅ ݕଵԢሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿሺݎ௄ ·
ܲݕܭԢ൅ݕܭԢ  
 
ܧ݊ܿሺݎଵ
ᇱ · ܲሺݕଵԢሻ ൅ ݕଵԢሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿሺݎ௄
ᇱ · ܲሺݕ௄Ԣሻ ൅ ݕ௄Ԣሻ 
 
 
4. Decrypt  ciphertexts received 
and compare obtained values 
with ݔଵ, … , ݔே 
 
 
 
5. Return the number of 
common elements and their 
values 
 
 
Figure 1: Private matching scheme outline 
 
2.2.2 Paillier’s cryptosystem  
Paillier’s cryptosystem was first proposed in [27]. This is a public-key encryption, based on usual 
modular arithmetic.  
 
Key generation  
1. Choose two large prime numbers ݌ and ݍ 
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2. Set  ݊ ൌ ݌ · ݍ and  ߣ ൌ ݈ܿ݉ሺ݌ െ 1, ݍ െ 1ሻ 
3. Randomly select ݃ א Ժ௡మ
כ  : gcdሺ௚
ഊ௠௢ௗ௡మିଵ
௡
, ݊ሻ ൌ 1 
4. Consider ݊, ݃ as public parameters and ݌, ݍ as private ones. 
 
Encryption 
1. Given message ݉ א Ժ௡כ   
2. Select a random ݎ ൏ ݊ 
3. Compute ciphertext ܿ ൌ ݃௠ · ݎ௡ ݉݋݀ ݊ଶ 
 
Decryption 
1. Given ciphertext ܿ א Ժ௡మ
כ  
2. Compute plaintext ݉ ൌ ܮ൫ܿఒ ݉݋݀ ݊ଶ൯ · ቀܮ൫݃ఒ ݉݋݀ ݊ଶ൯ቁ
ିଵ
݉݋݀ ݊ , where ܮሺݑሻ ൌ ௨ିଵ
௡
 
 
Properties  
Paillier’s encryption function satisfies the following properties: 
 
1. It is a homomorphic function. 
 
Proof:  
׊ ݉ଵ, ݉ଶ א  ܼ௡כ : 
ܧ݊ܿሺ݉ଵ ൅ ݉ଶሻ ൌ ݃௠భା௠మ · ݎ௡ ݉݋݀ ݊ଶ ൌ ݃௠భ · ݃௠మ · ݎ௡ ݉݋݀ ݊ଶ ൌ
ൌ ሺ݃௠భ · ݎ௡ ݉݋݀ ݊ଶሻ · ሺ݃௠మ · ݎ௡ ݉݋݀ ݊ଶሻ݉݋݀ ݊ଶ ൌ ܧ݊ܿሺ݉ଵሻ · ܧ݊ܿሺ݉ଶሻ݉݋݀ ݊ଶ 
□ 
 
2. It allows multiplication by a constant  
 
Proof: ׊ ݉ א ܼ௡כ , ݇ א Գ “ 
ܧ݊ܿሺ݇ · ݉ሻ ൌ ݃௞·௠ · ݎ௡ ݉݋݀ ݊ଶ ൌ ሺ݃௠ሻ௞ · ݎ௡ ݉݋݀ ݊ଶ ൌ ሺ݃௠ · ݎ௡ ݉݋݀ ݊ଶሻ௞ ݉݋݀ ݊ଶ ൌ 
                      ൌ ሺܧ݊ܿሺ݉ሻሻ௞݉݋݀݊ଶ 
□ 
 
Thus Paillier’s encryption function satisfies the properties listed in paragraph 2.2, so it can be used 
in private matching scheme described in paragraph Private matching scheme description 2.2.1  
 
2.3 Privacy-Preserving Data Comparison Protocol 
This original privacy-preserving data comparison protocol was created as an alternative way to 
perform documents comparison in privacy-preserving way. This protocol is based on the use of 
commutative encryption, that is: 
 
 If ܧ݊ܿଵ and ܧ݊ܿଶ are two commutative encryption functions and ݉ is a plaintext, then ciphertexts 
ܧ݊ܿଵሺܧ݊ܿଶሺ݉ሻሻ and ܧ݊ܿଶሺܧ݊ܿଵሺ݉ሻሻ are equal.   
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 As the example of commutative encryption, The Massey-Omura cryptosystem [28] can be used. It 
is described in paragraph 2.3.2.   
 
2.3.1 Privacy-preserving Data Comparison Protocol Description 
 
Let Alice and Bob represent two parties. Alice has a set of elements ܺ ൌ ሼݔଵ, … , ݔேሽ. Bob has a set 
of elements ܻ ൌ ሼݕଵ, … , ݕேሽ. Protocol is organized as follows.  
 
Alice and Bob define the commutative encryption functions ܧ݊ܿଵ and ܧ݊ܿଶ, respectively. Both of 
them encrypt their elements with the corresponding encryption function and send the obtained sets 
to each other. Having received the encrypted Alice’s elements, Bob encrypts them, using ܧ݊ܿଶ, 
permutes and sends to Alice. Meanwhile, Alice encrypts Bob’s encrypted elements, using ܧ݊ܿଵ.  
Then she receives back her elements, modified by Bob. At the moment Alice has two sets: 
ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺܺԢሻ and ܧ݊ܿଵܧ݊ܿଶሺܻሻ. Because of commutative encryption property, the ciphertexts of the 
elements, that contains in X and Y set intersection, are identical.  So the number of common 
elements in ܺ, ܻ sets are the same as the number of common elements in  ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺܺԢሻ  and ܧ݊ܿଵ 
ܧ݊ܿଶሺܻሻ sets. All Alice needs to get a result is to compare these new sets. Since Bob has shuffled 
Alice’s encrypted elements, Alice can’t determine which of her elements are identical to Bob’s ones. 
The detailed protocol description is given in Figure 2. 
 
 
Alice 
 
 Bob 
1. Choose the parameters for a 
homomorphic encryption function ܧ݊ܿଵ 
 
 1. Choose the parameters for a 
homomorphic encryption function ܧ݊ܿଶ 
 
2. Encrypt Alice’s elements with ܧ݊ܿଵ 
to get set ܧଵሺܺሻ 
 
 2. Encrypt Bob’s elements with ܧ݊ܿଶ to 
get ܧଶሺܻሻ 
 
  ܧଵሺܺሻ  
 
 
 
 
ܧଶሺܻሻ  
 
 
3. Encrypt ܧଶሺܻሻwith  ܧ݊ܿଵ  to get set 
ܧଵܧଶሺܻሻ  
 
 3. Encrypt ܧଵሺܺሻ  with ܧ݊ܿଶ  to get set 
ܧଶܧଵሺܺሻ 
  4. Randomly permute ܧଶܧଵሺܺሻ to get set 
ܧଶܧଵሺܺԢሻ 
 
 ܧଶܧଵሺܺԢሻ  
 
 
4. compare ܧଵܧଶሺܻሻand ܧଶܧଵሺܺԢሻ 
5.return the number of common 
elements 
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Figure 2: Privacy-preserving data comparison protocol outline 
 
2.3.2 Massey-Omura cryptosystem 
The Massey-Omura cryptosystem was described in [28]. It was created for secure data transfer 
between 2 parties. Let Alice and Bob represent two parties. Alice needs to send message M to Bob. 
The message transfer scheme is described below. 
 
Key generation: 
1. Alice choose a large prime number ݍ  
2. ݍ is considered as a public key 
3. Alice selects a random positive integer ݁ଵ , such that ݁ଵ ൏ ݍ  and ݃ܿ݀ሺ݁ଵ, ݍ െ 1ሻ ൌ 1 , and 
computes  ݀ଵ ൌ ݁ଵିଵ݉݋݀ ݍ െ 1 
4. Bob selects a random positive integer ݁ଶ, such that ݁ଶ ൏ ݍ and ݃ܿ݀ሺ݁ଶ, ݍ െ 1ሻ ൌ 1, and computes  
 ݀ଶ ൌ ݁ଶିଵ݉݋݀ ݍ െ 1 
5. ݁ଵ, ݀ଵ are Alice’s private keys, ݁ଶ, ݀ଶ are Bob’s private keys. 
 
Encryption: 
1. Given message ݉ א Ժ௤כ  
2. Let ݁ be a private key 
3. Compute ciphertext ܿ ൌ ܯ௘ ݉݋݀ ݍ 
 
Decryption: 
1. Given ciphertext ܿ߳Ժ௤כ  
2. Let ݀ be a private key, such that ݀ ൌ ݁ିଵ ݉݋݀ ݍ െ 1 
3. Compute message ݉ ൌ ܿௗ ݉݋݀ ݍ 
 
Message transfer: 
The Massey-Omura cryptosystem requires three messages to be sent to achieve a secure 
transmission. This process is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Alice  Bob 
   
Alice needs to send a 
message ܯ 
  
   1. ܣ ൌ ܯ௘భ݉݋݀ ݍ  
   
 2. Bൌ ܣ௘మ݉݋݀ ݍ  
   
     3. Cൌ ܤௗభ݉݋݀ ݍ   
   
  4. Bob calculates ܦ ൌ ܥௗమ݉݋݀ ݍ 
and gets the message ܯ, that is 
equal to ܦ 
Figure 3: Massey-Omura message transfer protocol 
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Properties 
Massey-Omura cryptosystem satisfies the property of commutative encryption. 
 
Proof:  
Let ݍ be a public key. ܧ݊ܿଵ is an encryption function with ݁ ଵ private key, and ܧ݊ܿଶ is an encryption 
function with ݁ଶ private key. Given message ݉ א Ժ௤כ . Then 
ܧ݊ܿଵ൫ܧ݊ܿଶሺܯሻ൯ ൌ ܧ݊ܿଵሺܯ௘మ ݉݋݀ ݍሻ ൌ ሺܯ௘మሻ௘భ ݉݋݀ ݍ ൌ ܯ௘భ·௘మ݉݋݀ ݍ ൌ  
ൌ ሺܯ௘భሻ௘మ ݉݋݀ ݍ ൌ ܧ݊ܿଶሺܯ௘భ ݉݋݀ ݍሻ ൌ ܧ݊ܿଶ൫ܧ݊ܿଵሺܯሻ൯ 
□  
 
Thus, Massey-Omura encryption functions satisfy the property mentioned in paragraph 2.3. So they 
can be used in protocol described in paragraph 2.3.1. 
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3 Solution 
Within the bounds of IKT590 project, two methods for privacy-preserving documents similarity 
detection were designed, implemented and tested. The description of these steps is given in this 
chapter.    
3.1 Requirements 
As it was said in paragraph 1.2, the goal of this project is to develop a method for privacy-
preserving document similarity detection. This method should satisfy the following requirements: 
 
General requirements: 
1. It should take as little time as possible. 
2. The number of data transfers should be minimized. 
   
Functional requirements: 
1. It should find semantically similar documents. 
2. It should find syntactically similar documents. 
3. It should detect a document that is a part of another one. 
4. It should detect documents that contain common part. 
5. It should be possible to compare several documents at once. 
 
Security requirements: 
1. No third party should be involved.  
2. It is allowed to know the number of words, participating in comparison. 
3. Every party have a right to know the number of words, containing in both compared 
documents.  
4. There should be no way to know the words, containing in both compared documents. 
5. There should be no way for each party to know the words of another party. 
3.2 Input Data 
For each party input data are one or several documents in .txt format. The documents should be 
written in English language. The tables and drawing are not processed. The documents, containing 
none or one word, don’t participate in the comparison process. 
3.3 Output Data 
The output data shows the type of similarity relationship between each document of one party and 
each document of another party. Let ܦ݋ܿଵ and ܦ݋ܿଶ are two documents, have been compared. The 
similarity relationship types between them can be following:  
 
1. The documents are syntactically similar (duplicates) 
2. The documents are almost syntactically similar (near duplicates) 
3. The documents are semantically similar 
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4. The documents share common part 
5. ܦ݋ܿଵ is a semantically similar to some part of ܦ݋ܿଶ 
6. ܦ݋ܿଶ is a semantically similar to some part of ܦ݋ܿଵ 
7. Documents are different 
3.4 Design Specification  
According to the requirements, given in paragraph 3.1, two methods for privacy-preserving 
document similarity detection were designed and implemented. In this chapter the detailed 
overview of these methods can be found. 
 
3.4.1 Methods overview 
Let Alice and Bob represent two parties. Alice has a set of documents ܦ݋ܿ_ܣ, Bob has a set of 
documents ܦ݋ܿ_ܤ. They want to know the types of similarity relationship between their documents. 
To find the answer, they use one of two developed methods: Method 1 or Method 2. These 
methods have similar basic structure. 
 
At first Alice and Bob prepare their documents and determine the areas, the documents are related 
to, using ontology. Then each party process every document, applying Natural Language 
Processing techniques described in paragraph 2.1.1, and transforms it to the set of distinct 
meaningful words, called footprint. According to the method parties have chosen, Alice compares 
her every footprint with each Bob’s one in privacy-preserving way and gets the number of common 
words in each footprint pair. Also she finds the semantic relationship between her and Bob’s 
documents performing the secure area names comparison. To guarantee the privacy of footprints 
and area names during comparison process, Method 1 employs the privacy-preserving data 
comparison protocol, while Method 2 uses the modified private-matching scheme. According to the 
numbers of common words and semantic relationship, Alice finds the types of similarity relationship 
between her and Bob’s documents. The generalized description of privacy-preserving document 
similarity detection process is shown in Figure 4. 
 
Alice 
 
 Bob 
For every Alice’s document repeat 
steps 1-2: 
 For every Bob’s document repeat 
steps 1-2: 
1. Find areas, document is 
related to 
 
 1. Find areas, document is 
related to 
2. Find footprint 
 
 2. Find footprint 
3. Compare every Alice’s footprint 
with each Bob’s footprint according 
to the selected method to get the 
number of common words  
 
 3. Participate in footprint 
comparison process 
4. Compare area names of every 
Alice’s document with areas 
name’s of every Bob’s document 
 4. Participating in area names 
comparison 
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according to selected method to get 
the semantic relationship between 
documents 
 
5. Find result according to the 
number of common words and 
semantic relationship 
  
 
Figure 4: Privacy-preserving document similarity detection process outline 
 
3.4.2 Areas finding  
To find the areas, document is related to, ontology is used. It is one of the Natural Language 
Processing technique described in paragraph 2.1.1. Ontology consists of areas that, in turn, can 
contain some other areas. Every area is described by the set of terms in an unique way. Each term 
can be a phrase or a single word. It is allowed to include the same term in several sets. The 
ontology structure is presented in Figure 5.      
 
 
Figure 5: Ontology structure 
The areas are determined according to the ontology terms the document contains. The finding 
process consists of following steps: 
 
 For every ontology area repeat steps 1-2: 
1. Search for all terms this area is described by.  
2. If the number of found terms is greater than some predefined value, add the name of this area 
to the list of area names 
3. Return the list of area names  
 
The threshold was introduced to avoid the wrong area detection in the following cases:  
1. There are homonymous words to the ontology terms in the document 
2. A few terms from some area are mentioned in the document, but the document actually isn’t 
related to this area. 
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3.4.3 Footprint finding 
Footprint finding is a second step in a privacy-preserving document similarity detection process. It 
is based on the application of several Natural language processing techniques described in 
paragraph 2.1.1. This step is performed to transform a document into a set of distinct meaningful 
words, called footprints. Meaningful words are the words reflecting the semantics of the document 
content. They are nouns, adjectives and verbs. In [16] it was experimentally shown by the example 
of English language that it is enough to compare only the words, marked with these parts of speech, 
in order to detect the semantic similarity of the documents. The removal of other parts of speech 
allows to increase the algorithm performance during the footprint comparison step. But there is one 
disadvantage of this approach. The users can’t be sure whether the documents are 100% identical 
in case of document footprints equality. If it is important for the users, the additional word-by-word 
documents comparison can be performed.  
 
The following Natural Language Processing techniques are used to find document footprint: 
tokenization, part-of-speech tagging, stemming. All of them, except tokenization, require the 
presence of the knowledge base. 
 
The footprint finding process starts with the knowledge base preparation (it will be explained in 
3.5.1.1). Then all letters are converted to lower-case and the document is divided into separate 
words, called token. After that every token is marked with appropriate part-of-speech tag and the 
ones with noun, adjective and verbs tags are selected. The chosen tokens are stemmed. Then 
repetitions in list of stemmed tokens are deleted and footprint is ready. The overview of the footprint 
finding process is shown in Figure 6.  
 
1. Prepare knowledge base 
2. Convert all letters to lower-case 
3. Perform document tokenization 
4. Perform part-of-speech tagging 
5. Choose words with nouns, verbs and adjectives tags. 
6. Perform stemming 
7. Delete repetitions 
Figure 6: Footprint finding process 
 
3.4.4 Footprint comparison 
During the footprint comparison step every footprint of one party is compared with each footprint of 
another party and number of common words between them is found. The comparison is performed 
by one of the parties. Let it be Alice. According to the chosen method for privacy-preserving 
document similarity detection, she can compare the footprints in one of two ways: using privacy-
preserving data comparison protocol or applying modified private-matching scheme. The 
description of Method 1 and Method 2 footprint comparison steps are given below.  
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3.4.4.1 Method 1 footprint comparison algorithm 
 
Method 1 footprint comparison algorithm is based on privacy-preserving data interchanging 
protocol described in paragraph 2.3 and has the following structure. 
 
Let Alice has a set of footprints ܨ݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺ ൌ ሼ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺ଵ, … , ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺ேሽ.  Bob has a set of footprints 
ܨ݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻ ൌ ሼ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻ଵ, … , ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻௄ሽ . The algorithm starts from the footprints preparation for 
comparison process. Alice divides each footprint into 2 subsets. The first one consists of the words, 
containing in all her footprints. The second one consists of the rest of the words, not containing in 
the first subset. Alice transforms every word in the subsets into numerical representation. As the 
result she gets subsets ܥ݋݉஺, ܦ݂݅ ஺݂ଵ ,…, ܦ݂݅ ஺݂ே. The same actions are performed by Bob and he 
obtains the subsets ܥ݋݉஻, ܦ݂݅ ஻݂ଵ,…,  ܦ݂݅ ஻݂௄. The footprints are divided into 2 subsets to avoid the 
encryption and transfer of the words that are in all footprints of one party several times. In some 
cases, e.g. when all documents are related to the same area, the saving of time can be significant.   
 
Then Alice and Bob define homomorphic encryption functions ܧ݊ܿଵ and ܧ݊ܿଶ, respectively. They 
encrypte their subsets with corresponding encryption functions and send them to each other. 
Having received the encrypted Alice’s subsets, Bob encrypts them with ܧ݊ܿଶ, permutes elements in 
every subset and sends to Alice. Meanwhile, Alice encrypts Bob’s encrypted subsets, using ܧ݊ܿଵ. 
Then she receives back her subsets, modified by Bob. At the moment Alice has following sets: 
ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺܥ݋݉஺
ᇱ ሻ,  ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺܦ݂݅ ஺݂ଵᇱ ሻ , … , ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺܦ݂݅ ஺݂ேᇱ ሻ, ܧ݊ܿଵܧ݊ܿଶሺܥ݋݉஻ሻ, ܧ݊ܿଵܧ݊ܿଶሺܦ݂݅ ஻݂ଵሻ, …, 
 ܧ݊ܿଵܧ݊ܿଶሺܦ݂݅ ஻݂௄ሻ . She unions ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺܥ݋݉஺ᇱ ሻ  with ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺܦ݂݅ ஺݂ଵᇱ ሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺܦ݂݅ ஺݂ேᇱ ሻ  to 
get her encrypted footprints ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺ଵᇱ ሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺ேᇱ ሻ and unions 
ܧ݊ܿଵܧ݊ܿଶሺܥ݋݉஻ሻ  with  ܧ݊ܿଵܧ݊ܿଶሺܦ݂݅ ஻݂ଵሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿଵܧ݊ܿଶሺܦ݂݅ ஻݂௄ሻ  to get Bob’s encrypted footprints 
ܧ݊ܿଵܧ݊ܿଶሺ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻ଵሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿଵܧ݊ܿଶሺ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻௄ሻ.Then she compares each of her encrypted footprints 
with every Bob’s encrypted footprint to find the number of common words. The detailed algorithm 
description is given in Figure 7.  
 
Alice 
 
 Bob 
1. Find the words, that are in all Alice’s 
footprints and transform them into 
numerical representation to get set ܥ݋݉஺ 
 
 1. Find the words, that are in all Bob’s 
footprints and transform them into 
numerical representation to get set ܥ݋݉஻ 
For every Alice’s footprint ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺௜  repeat 
step 2: 
 
 For every Bob’s footprint ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻௝ repeat 
step 2: 
2. Transform the footprint words, that are 
not in ܥ݋݉஺ into numerical representation 
and add them to the set ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺௜ 
 
 2. Transform the footprint words, that 
are not in ܥ݋݉஻  into numerical 
representation and add them to the set 
݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻௝ 
3. Choose the parameters for a 
commutative encryption function ܧ݊ܿଵ 
 
 3. Choose the parameters for a 
commutative encryption function ܧ݊ܿଶ 
 
Encryption public parameters 
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4. Encrypt ܥ݋݉஺, ܦ݂݅ ஺݂ଵ ,…, ܦ݂݅ ஺݂ே with ܧ݊ܿଵ  
 
 4. Encrypt ܥ݋݉஻, ܦ݂݅ ஻݂ଵ,…,  ܦ݂݅ ஻݂௄ 
with ܧ݊ܿଶ 
ܧ݊ܿଵሺܥ݋݉஺ሻ, ܧ݊ܿଵሺܦ݂݅ ஺݂ଵሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿଵሺܦ݂݅ ஺݂ேሻ 
 
 
ܧ݊ܿଶሺܥ݋݉஻ሻ, ܧ݊ܿଶሺܦ݂݅ ஻݂ଵሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿଶሺܦ݂݅ ஻݂௄ሻ 
  
 
5. Encrypt ܧ݊ܿଶሺܥ݋݉஻ሻ, ܧ݊ܿଶሺܦ݂݅ ஻݂ଵሻ, …, 
 ܧ݊ܿଶሺܦ݂݅ ஻݂௄ሻ with ܧ݊ܿଵ 
 
 5. Encrypt 
ܧ݊ܿଵሺܥ݋݉஺ሻ, ܧ݊ܿଵሺܦ݂݅ ஺݂ଵሻ, …,  
ܧ݊ܿଵሺܦ݂݅ ஺݂ேሻ with ܧ݊ܿଶ 
  6. Randomly permute elements in  
ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺܥ݋݉஺ሻ, ܧ݊ܿଶ ܧ݊ܿଵሺܦ݂݅ ஺݂ଵሻ, …,  
 ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺܦ݂݅ ஺݂ேሻ 
 
 
 
ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺܥ݋݉஺
ᇱ ሻ, ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺܦ݂݅ ஺݂ଵᇱ ሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺܦ݂݅ ஺݂ேᇱ ሻ 
 
 
6. Union ܧ݊ܿଵܧ݊ܿଶሺܥ݋݉஻ሻ with 
 ܧ݊ܿଵܧ݊ܿଶሺܦ݂݅ ஻݂ଵሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿଵܧ݊ܿଶሺܦ݂݅ ஻݂௄ሻ   to 
get 
ܧ݊ܿଵܧ݊ܿଶሺ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻ଵሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿଵܧ݊ܿଶሺ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻௄ሻ
 
  
7. Unite ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺܥ݋݉஺ᇱ ሻ  with 
ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺܦ݂݅ ஺݂ଵ
ᇱ ሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺܦ݂݅ ஺݂ே
ᇱ ሻ  to 
get 
ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺ଵ
ᇱ ሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺ே
ᇱ ሻ 
 
  
For every encrypted Alice’s footprint 
ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺௜
ᇱ ሻ and for every encrypted 
Bob’s footprint ܧ݊ܿଵܧ݊ܿଶ൫݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻௝൯ repeat 
steps 8-9: 
  
8. compare ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺௜ᇱ ሻ and 
ܧ݊ܿଵܧ݊ܿଶ൫݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻௝൯ 
  
9. return the number of common 
words 
 
  
Figure 7: Method 1 footprint comparison algorithm outline 
 
3.4.4.2 Method 2 footprint comparison algorithm 
 
Method 2 exploits modified private-matching scheme to perform footprint comparison in privacy-
preserving way. Modified private-matching scheme is a two-party protocol based on private-
matching scheme described in paragraph 2.2. Unfortunately, it wasn’t possible to use original 
private-matching scheme without any changes, because it reveals the words, containing in 
footprints intersection. In modified private matching scheme this drawback was eliminated. It 
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guarantees the privacy protection for all footprints words of every party. The description of modified 
private matching scheme steps can be found in Figure 9 below.   
 
Method 2 footprint comparison algorithm is the following. Let Alice has a set of footprints ܨ݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺ ൌ
ሼ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺ଵ, … , ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺ேሽ. Bob has a set of footprints ܨ݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻ ൌ ሼ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻ଵ, … , ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻௄ሽ. As well as in 
Method1 the algorithm starts from the footprints preparation for comparison process. Alice divides 
each footprint into 2 subsets. The first one consists of the words, containing in all her footprints. 
The second one consists of the rest of the words, not containing in the first subset. Alice transforms 
every word in the subsets into numerical representation. As the result she gets subsets ܥ݋݉஺ , 
ܦ݂݅ ஺݂ଵ  ,…, ܦ݂݅ ஺݂ே . The same actions are performed by Bob and he obtains the subsets 
ܥ݋݉஻ ,  ܦ݂݅ ஻݂ଵ ,…,  ܦ݂݅ ஻݂௄ . Alice defines a homomorphic encryption function and sends public 
parameters to Bob. Then for every of Alice’s subsets the following steps are performed: 
 
Let Alice ‘s subset consist of {ݔଵ, … , ݔ௅ }. Alice defines a polynomial ܲ, as shown below: 
Pሺtሻ ൌ ሺxଵ െ tሻሺxଶ െ tሻ … ሺxL െ tሻ ൌ ෍ a୳t୳
L
୳ୀ଴
 
 
She sends encrypted coefficients to Bob. Bob evaluates the polynomial at each of his numbers of 
each of his subsets. As the result he obtains the sets 
ܧ݊ܿ൫ܲሺܥ݋݉஻ሻ൯, ܧ݊ܿ൫ܲሺܦ݂݅ ஻݂ଵሻ൯, . . . , ܧ݊ܿሺܲሺܦ݂݅ ஻݂௄ሻሻ . He raises each of his result to a random 
power ݎ  and multiplies it by an encryption of 1  to get sets ܧ݊ܿሺݎ଴ · ܲሺܥ݋݉஻ሻ ൅ 1ሻ , ܧ݊ܿሺݎଵ ·
ܲሺܦ݂݅ ஻݂ଵሻ ൅ 1ሻ ,…, ܧ݊ܿሺݎ௄ · ܲሺܦ݂݅ ஻݂௄ሻ ൅ 1ሻ. He sends them to Alice. Alice decrypts received data, 
count the number of 1’s in each of Bob’s decrypted set. This number represents the number of 
common words, sharing by Alice’s subset and corresponding Bob’s subset. 
 
The number of common words, containing in Alice’s footprint ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺௜ and Bob’s footprint ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻௝ 
for  ݅ ൌ 1, ܰ , ݆ ൌ 1, ܭ  is calculated as follows: 
 
݊ݑ݉_ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏሺ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺௜, ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻௝ሻ ൌ ݊ݑ݉_ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏሺܥ݋݉஺, ܥ݋݉஻ሻ ൅ ݊ݑ݉_ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏሺܥ݋݉஺, ܦ݂݅ ஻݂௝ሻ ൅ 
                         ൅݊ݑ݉_ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏሺܦ݂݅ ஺݂௜, ܥ݋݉஻ሻ ൅ ݊ݑ݉_ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏሺܦ݂݅ ஺݂௜, ܦ݂݅ ஻݂௝ሻ, 
 
where  ݊ݑ݉_ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏሺܺ, ܻሻ is a number of common words, containing in set ܺ and set ܻ 
 
The detailed description of Method 2 footprint comparison algorithm is given in Figure 8. The 
overview of modified private matching scheme is represented in Figure 9. 
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Alice 
 
 Bob 
1. Find the words, that are in all Alice’s 
footprints and transform them into 
numerical representation to get set ܥ݋݉஺ 
 
 1. Find the words, that are in all 
Bob’s footprints and transform them 
into numerical representation to get 
set ܥ݋݉஻ 
 
For every Alice’s footprint ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺௜ repeat 
step 2: 
 For every Bob’s footprint 
݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻௝ repeat step 2: 
2. Transform the footprint words, that 
are not in ܥ݋݉஺  into numerical 
representation and add them to the set 
ܦ݂݅ ஺݂௜  
 
 2. Transform the footprint words, 
that are not in ܥ݋݉஻ into numerical 
representation and add them to 
the set ܦ݂݅ ஻݂௝ 
3. Choose the parameters for a 
homomorphic encryption function ܧ݊ܿ 
 
  
Public encryption parameters 
 
For every set ܵ݁ݐܣ in { ܥ݋݉஺ , ܦ݂݅ ஺݂ଵ ,…, 
ܦ݂݅ ஺݂ே} repeat steps 4-6: 
  
4. define polynomial ܲ with coefficients 
ܽ଴, … , ܽ௅ 
  
5. Encrypt coefficients, to get set  
{ܧ݊ܿሺܽ଴ሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿሺܽ௅ሻ} 
 
  
{ܧ݊ܿሺܽ଴ሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿሺܽ௅ሻ} 
 
 
  For every set ܵ݁ݐܤ in { ܥ݋݉஻ , 
ܦ݂݅ ஻݂ଵ,…,  ܦ݂݅ ஻݂௄} do steps 3-4: 
  3. For every element in ܵ݁ݐܤ 
repat steps a-b: 
  a. Choose a random value ݎ 
 
  b. compute ܧ݊ܿሺݎ ൉ ܲሺݕሻ ൅ 1ሻ
 
  4. randomly permute elements 
in set ܧ݊ܿሺݎ ൉ ܲሺܵ݁ݐܤሻ ൅ 1ሻ to 
get ܧ݊ܿሺݎ ൉ ܲሺܵ݁ݐܤᇱሻ ൅ 1ሻ 
 
ܧ݊ܿሺݎ଴ ൉ ܲሺܥ݋݉஻
ᇱ ሻ ൅ 1ሻ, ܧ݊ܿሺݎଵ ൉ ܲሺܦ݂݅ ஻݂ଵᇱ ሻ ൅ 1ሻ,…, 
ܧ݊ܿሺݎ௄ ൉ ܲሺܦ݂݅ ஻݂௄
ᇱ ሻ ൅ 1ሻ 
 
 
6. For every set ܵ݁ݐܤ in { ܧ݊ܿሺݎ଴ ൉
ܲܥ݋݉ܤԢ൅1,   ܧ݊ܿሺݎ1൉ܲሺܦ݂݂݅ܤ1Ԣሻ൅1ሻ,…,  
ܧ݊ܿሺݎ௄ ൉ ܲሺܦ݂݅ ஻݂௄
ᇱ ሻ ൅ 1ሻ }  
repeat steps a-b: 
  
a. Decrypt all values in ܵ݁ݐܤ   
b. Count number of 1Ԣݏ to get   
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number of common words between 
ܵ݁ݐܣ  and ܵ݁ݐܤ , denoted 
nݑ݉_ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏሺܵ݁ݐܣ, ܵ݁ݐܤሻ 
 
For every Alice’s footprint ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺௜ and 
every Bob’s footprint ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻௝ repeat 
steps 7-8: 
  
7. Find the number of common 
words ݊ݑ݉_ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏሺ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺௜, ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻௝ሻ
  
8. Return the number of common 
words 
  
 
Figure 8: Method 2 footprint comparison algorithm outline 
     
Alice 
 
 Bob 
1. Choose the parameters for a 
homomorphic encryption 
function ܧ݊ܿ 
  
 Public parameters 
 
 
2. Define the polynomial ܲ with 
roots ݔଵ, … , ݔܰ and coefficients  
ܽ଴, … , ܽ௅  
 
  
3. Encrypt coefficients, to get 
set  {ܧ݊ܿሺܽ଴ሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿሺܽ௅ሻ} 
 
  
  {ܧ݊ܿሺܽ଴ሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿሺܽ௅ሻ}  
 
  For every Bob’s input y repeat 
steps 1-2:    
  1. Choose a random value ݎ 
 
  2. compute ܧ݊ܿሺݎ ൉ ܲሺݕሻ ൅ 1ሻ 
 
  3. randomly permute { ܧ݊ܿሺݎଵ ൉
ܲሺݕଵሻ ൅ 1ሻ,…, ܧ݊ܿሺݎ௄ ൉ ܲሺݕ௄ሻ ൅ 1ሻ} 
to get  
{ ܧ݊ܿሺݎଵ ൉ ܲሺݕଵ
ᇱ ሻ ൅ 1ሻ,…, ܧ݊ܿሺݎ௄ ൉
ܲሺݕ௄
ᇱ ሻ ൅ 1ሻ}  
 
{ ܧ݊ܿሺݎଵ ൉ ܲሺݕଵ
ᇱ ሻ ൅ 1ሻ,…, ܧ݊ܿሺݎ௄ ൉ ܲሺݕ௄
ᇱ ሻ ൅ 1ሻ} 
 
 
4. Decrypt  ciphertexts received 
and count the number of 1’s 
 
  
5. Return the number of 1’s    
 
Figure 9: Modified private matching scheme overview 
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3.4.4.3 Word transformation into numerical representation 
Both modified private matching scheme and privacy-preserving data comparison protocol operate 
with numbers. So in order to use these methods for footprints comparison, it is necessary to 
transform all words into numerical representation. This is done according to the following rule: 
 
Each word is considered as a string of symbolsݔଵ, … , ݔே, where ݔ௜, ݅ ൌ 1, ܰ can be a number, a 
Latin letter, or one of the symbols ‘-‘, ‘ ‘, ’’ (empty symbol). For each symbol the number, 
corresponding to this symbol, is determined according to the Table 1. Then the word is represented 
as a number ܨሺݔ଴ݔଵ … ݔேሻ, calculated by the formula below:  
 
ܨሺݔ଴ݔଵ … ݔேሻ ൌ ܽ଴ሺݔேሻ · 39଴൅ܽଵሺݔேିଵሻ39ଵ ൅ ڮ ൅ ܽேሺݔ଴ሻ39ே, 
 
 
where ܽ௜ሺݔேି௜ሻ is a number corresponding to the symbol ሺݔேି௜ሻ 
 
 
Symbol  Number  Symbol Number  Symbol Number 
        
0 27  d 4  q 17 
1 28  e 5  r 18 
2 29  f 6  s 19 
3 30  g 7  t 20 
4 31  h 8  u 21 
5 32  i 9  v 22 
6 33  j 10  w 23 
7 34  k 11  x 24 
8 35  l 12  y 25 
9 36  m 13  z 26 
a 1  n 14  ‘ ‘ 37 
b 2  o 15  ‘-‘ 38 
c 3  p 16  ‘’ 0 
Table 1: Symbol encoding table 
 
3.4.5 Area names comparison 
The goal of the area names comparison is to find out the type of semantic relationship between a 
pair of documents. Without the information about semantic relationship the documents will be just 
considered as having a common part.  
 
The types of semantic relationship are the following: 
1. The area names are equal 
2. The area names of one party is equal to the some area names of another party 
3. The areas names are not equal 
 
The type of semantic relationship between documents is detected by the performing of two steps. 
During the first step the area names are compared according to the chosen method for privacy-
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preserving document similarity detection and the number of common names is found. In Method 1 
privacy-preserving data comparison protocol, given in paragraph 2.3, is used. In Method 2 modified 
private matching scheme, described in paragraph 3.4.4.2 in Figure 9, is applied. During the second 
step the type of semantic relationship between documents is determined as it described below: 
  
Let ݄ܶଵ  be Alice’s list of area names and ݄ܶଶ be Bob’s list of area names. ܮଵ is a power of ݄ܶଵ, ܮଶ 
is a power of ݄ܶଶ and ܥ݋݉ is a number of common areas, founded in first step. Then:   
 
If ܥ݋݉==0: 
 Area names are not equal 
else: 
If ܮଵ ൌ ܥ݋݉ and ܮଶ ൌ ܥ݋݉: 
  Area names are equal  
If ܮଵ ൐ ܥ݋݉ and ܮଶ ൌ ܥ݋݉: 
  Bob’s area names are equal to some Alice’s area names 
If ܮଵ ൌ ܥ݋݉ and ܮଶ ൐ ܥ݋݉: 
  Alice’s area names are equal to some Bob’s area names 
If ܮଵ ൐ ܥ݋݉ and ܮଶ ൐ ܥ݋݉: 
 Area names are not equal 
 
The general description of Method 1 and Method 2 area names comparison algorithms is given in 
Figure 10 and Figure 11, respectively. 
 
Alice 
 
 Bob 
For every Alice’s document repeat 
steps 1-4: 
 For every Bob’s document repeat 
steps 1-3: 
1. Transform every area name into 
numerical representation and 
encrypt with ܧ݊ܿଵ to get set 
ܧଵሺ݄ܶ஺ሻ 
 1. Transform every area name 
into numerical representation and 
encrypt with ܧ݊ܿଶ  to get set 
ܧଶሺ݄ܶ஻ሻ 
  ܧଵሺ݄ܶ஺ሻ  
 
 
 
 
 ܧଶሺ݄ܶ஻ሻ  
 
2. Encrypt ܧଶሺ݄ܶ஻ሻ with  ܧ݊ܿଵ  to 
get set ܧଵܧଶሺ݄ܶ஻ሻ  
 
 2. Encrypt ܧଵሺ݄ܶ஺ሻ with ܧ݊ܿଶ  to 
get set ܧଶܧଵሺ݄ܶ஺ሻ 
  3. Randomly permute ܧଶܧଵሺ݄ܶ஺ሻto 
get set ܧଶܧଵሺ݄ܶ஺ᇱ ሻ 
 
ܧଶܧଵሺ݄ܶ஺
ᇱ ሻ 
 
 
3. compare ܧଵܧଶሺ݄ܶ஻ሻ  and 
ܧଶܧଵሺ݄ܶ஺
ᇱ ሻ 
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4.return the number of common 
areas 
 
 
Figure 10: Method 1 area names comparison algorithm outline 
Alice 
 
 Bob 
For every Alice’s document 
ܦ݋ܿ஺ repeat steps 1-4: 
 For every Bob’s document repeat 
step 1: 
1. Transform every area 
name into numerical 
representation to get 
ܣ݄ܶଵ, … , ܣ݄ܶ௅ 
 
 1. Transform every area name 
into numerical representation to 
get the set ܤ݄ܶ݁݉݁ݏ 
2. Define the polynomial ܲ 
with roots ܣ݄ܶଵ, … , ܣ݄ܶ௅ 
and coefficients  ܽଵ, … , ܽ௅  
 
  
3. Encrypt coefficients, to 
get set 
ሼܧ݊ܿሺܽ଴ሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿሺܽ௅ሻሽ 
 
  
ሼܧ݊ܿሺܽ଴ሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿሺܽ௅ሻሽ 
 
 
  For every Bob’s document do steps 3-
4: 
  3. For every area name ܤ݄ܶ  in 
ܤ݄ܶ݁݉݁ݏ repeat steps a-b: 
  a. Choose a random value ݎ
 
  b. compute ܧ݊ܿሺݎ · ܲሺܤ݄ܶሻ ൅
1ሻ 
 
  4. randomly permute elements in 
set 
ܧ݊ܿሺݎଵ · ܲሺܤ݄ܶଵሻ ൅ 1ሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿሺݎெ ·
ܲܤ݄ܶܯ൅1 to get  
ܧ݊ܿሺݎᇱ · ܲሺܤ݄ܶ݁݉݁ݏᇱሻ ൅ 1ሻ 
 
{ܧ݊ܿሺݎଵᇱ · ܲሺܤ݄ܶ݁݉݁ݏଵᇱ ሻ ൅ 1, … , ܧ݊ܿሺݎ௄ᇱ · ܲሺܤ݄ܶ݁݉݁ݏ௄ᇱ ሻ ൅ 1ሻሻ} 
 
 
4. For every Bob’s document 
ܦ݋ܿ஻ repeat steps a-c: 
  
a. Decrypt all values in 
ܧ݊ܿሺݎᇱ · ܲሺܤ݄ܶ݁݉݁ݏᇱሻ ൅ 1ሻ 
 
 
  
b. Count number of 1’s to get   
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number of common area 
names between ܦ݋ܿ஺  and 
ܦ݋ܿ஻, called Com 
 
c. Return Com   
Figure 11: Method 2 area names comparison algorithm outline 
. 
3.4.6 Result finding 
The following types of similarity can be determined using one of the methods for privacy-preserving 
document similarity detection: 
  
1. The documents are syntactically similar (duplicates) 
2. The documents are almost syntactically similar (near duplicates) 
3. The documents are semantically similar 
4. The documents share common part 
5. ܣ is semantically similar to the some part of ܤ 
6. ܤ is semantically similar to the some part of ܣ 
7. Documents are different 
 
In order to find a type of similarity between pair of documents, it is necessary to calculate ଵܰ and ଶܰ 
according to the formulas below: 
 
ଵܰ ൌ
݊ݑܾ݉݁ݎ ݋݂ ܿ݋݉݉݋݊ ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ
݊ݑܾ݉݁ݎ ݋݂ ݈݈ܽ ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ ݅݊ ܣ݈݅ܿ݁ᇱݏ ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ݅݊ݐ
 
 
ଶܰ ൌ
݊ݑܾ݉݁ݎ ݋݂ ܿ݋݉݉݋݊ ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ
݊ݑܾ݉݁ݎ ݋݂ ݈݈ܽ ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ ݅݊ ܤ݋ܾᇱݏ ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ݅݊ݐ
 
 
Such similarity metric was chosen because it allows to detect the situations when one document is 
a part of another one.  
 
Then according to the ଵܰ  and ଶܰ values and type of semantic relationship, the type of document 
similarity is determined as it shown in Table 3. The intervals for ଵܰand ଶܰvalues are preliminary and 
must be revised after implementation and testing phases depending on experiments results. The 
notations, used in Table 3 are explained in Table 2.  
 
 
Notation Meaning 
ܣ Alice’s document 
ܤ Bob’s document 
݄ܶଵ ൌ ݄ܶଶ Area names are equal 
݄ܶଵ ݄ܶଶ 
Alice’s area names are equal to some Bob’s 
area names 
݄ܶଶ ݄ܶଵ 
Bob’s area names are equal to some Alice’s  
area names 
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݄ܶଵ ݄ܶଶ Area names are not equal 
ܣ ൌ ܤ syntactically The documents are syntactically similar (duplicates) 
ܣ ൎ ܤ syntactically 
Near duplicated 
The documents are almost syntactically similar 
(near duplicates) 
ܣ ൌ ܤ semantically The documents are semantically similar  
ܣ ܤ semantically 
ܣ is semantically similar to the some part of ܤ 
 
ܤ ܣ semantically ܤ is semantically similar to the some part of ܣ  
Common part The documents share common part 
ܣ ܤ Documents are different 
 
Table 2: Notations for Table 3 
 
Input parameters Output parameters 
N1 N2 Type of semantic 
relationship 
Type of document similarity 
1.0 
 
1.0 any ܣ ൌ ܤ syntactically 
Duplicate 
[0.85;1.0) any ܣ ൎ ܤ syntactically 
Near duplicated 
[0.4;0.85) any ܣ ܤ syntactically 
(0;0.4) any ܣ ܤ syntactically 
 
[0.85;1.0) 1.0 any ܣ ൎ ܤ syntactically 
Near duplicated 
[0.85;1.0) any ܣ ൎ ܤ syntactically 
Near duplicated 
[0.4;0.85) ݄ܶଵ ൌ ݄ܶଶ  ܣ ൌ ܤ semantically 
݄ܶଵ ݄ܶଶ ܣ ܤ semantically 
݄ܶଶ ݄ܶଵ ܤ ܣ semantically 
݄ܶଵ ݄ܶଶ Common part 
(0;0.4) ݄ܶଵ ൌ ݄ܶଶ  ܣ ܤ semantically 
݄ܶଵ ݄ܶଶ ܣ ܤ semantically 
݄ܶଶ ݄ܶଵ ܤ ܣ semantically 
݄ܶଵ ݄ܶଶ Common part 
 
[0.4;0.85) 1.0 any ܤ ܣ syntactically 
[0.85;1.0) ݄ܶଵ ൌ ݄ܶଶ  ܣ ൌ ܤ semantically 
݄ܶଵ ݄ܶଶ ܣ ܤ semantically 
݄ܶଶ ݄ܶଵ ܤ ܣ semantically 
݄ܶଵ ݄ܶଶ Common part 
[0.4;0.85) ݄ܶଵ ൌ ݄ܶଶ  ܣ ൌ ܤ semantically 
݄ܶଵ ݄ܶଶ ܣ ܤ semantically 
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݄ܶଶ ݄ܶଵ ܤ ܣ semantically 
݄ܶଵ ݄ܶଶ Common part 
(0;0.4) any ܣ ܤ 
 
(0;0.4) 1.0 any ܤ ܣ syntactically 
[0.85;1.0) ݄ܶଵ ൌ ݄ܶଶ  ܤ ܣ semantically 
݄ܶଵ ݄ܶଶ ܣ ܤ semantically 
݄ܶଶ ݄ܶଵ ܤ ܣ semantically 
݄ܶଵ ݄ܶଶ Common part 
[0.4;0.85) any ܣ ܤ 
(0;0.4) any ܣ ܤ 
0 0 any ܣ ܤ 
Table 3: Documents similarity type finding table 
3.5 Implementation 
In this paragraph the implementation step is given in details. In contrast to the design part, the 
description is presented separately for each method. 
 
3.5.1 Method 1 implementation 
Method 1 was implemented according to the design specification described in paragraph 3.4 in the 
following way. Let Alice and Bob represent two parties. Alice is responsible for finding the similarity 
types between documents. Method 1 starts with the procedure that checks if both parties have 
documents to compare. The next step is a knowledge base preparation. During this step each party 
gathers together all necessary data for footprint and area finding steps execution. Having prepared 
the knowledge base, Alice and Bob find areas and footprints for their documents. If some document 
contains less than 20 words, this document doesn’t participate in comparison process any more. 
It’s prohibited to compare small size footprints in order to eliminate the opportunity to reveal the 
words of the other party footprints. If at least one party has all footprint containing less than 20 
words, Method 1 execution is stopped. Else method execution is proceeding and parties send the 
lists of their document names to each other. After that Alice and Bob choose the parameters for 
their Massey-Omura encryption functions. Then footprints are compared and Alice gets the number 
of common words between each of her footprints and every Bob’s one. According to these results, 
she finds the types of similarity between their documents.  
 
The general overview of all Method 1 implementation steps is given in Figure 12. The detailed 
overview of each step can be found below.  
 
1. Check if Alice and Bob have documents to compare. If they have, go step 2, else STOP 
2. Each party performs knowledge base preparation step 
3. Each party finds areas and footprint for every document 
4. Each party deletes all documents, whose footprints contain less than 20 words  
5. Check if Alice and Bob have documents to compare. If they have, go step 6, else STOP 
6. Each party sends the list of the document names to another party 
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7. Footprint comparison 
8. Alice finds the types of similarity between documents   
Figure 12: Method 1 implementation steps overview 
 
3.5.1.1 Knowledge base preparation 
 
Several databases were used to form a knowledge base. The first one, called in the report as NLTK 
database, consists of the databases proposed by Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK). NLTK is an 
open source library that can be freely downloaded from [29]. “It was originally created in 2001 as a 
part of a computational linguistics course in the Department of Computer and Information Science 
at the University of Pennsylvania.  
Since then it has been developed and expanded with the help of dozens of contributors. It has now 
been adopted in courses in dozens of universities, and serves as the basis of many research 
projects.” [30]. NLTK database is used for part of speech tagging and stemming.  
 
The second database, called PoS (Part of Speech) database, was created to improve the part of 
speech tagging process and to be used for deleting of the frequently used words.  It consists of 
seven .txt files. The file names and their description can be found in Table 4. The content of all files 
can be found in Appendix A. The stop words and phrases were taken from [31], [32], [33], the 
prepositions - from [34], [35], [36], and adverbs – from [37], [38], [39].  
 
File name Description 
stopwords_mult.txt Contains stopwords, that are phrases 
stopwords_one.txt Contains stopwords, that are single words  
preposit_mult.txt Contains prepositions, that are phrases 
preposit_one.txt Contains prepositions, that are single words  
adverb_mult.txt Contains adverb, not ending with –ly, that are phrases 
adverb_one.txt Contains adverb words, not ending with –ly, that are single words 
nonadverb.txt Contains the words, ending with –ly, that are not adverbs 
Table 4: PoS database files 
 
Another data base, called Ontology database, was created for ontology implementation. This 
database consists of 3 files: ontology_structure.txt, ontology_mult.txt, ontology_one.txt. The first file 
contains information about ontology areas names, and number of terms, describing these areas. 
The second file contains ontology term phrases, and the third one contains ontology single words 
terms. These files have fixed structures. They are the following:           
 
ontology_structure.txt structure:   
 
File_line::=Area’:’Name_parent’:’Num_area’:’Synonym*[‘,’Synonym]* 
Area::=String 
Name_parent::=String 
Num_ area::=NUM+ 
Synonym::=String 
NUM::=’0’|-|’9’ 
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Area is a name of area, 
Name_parent is a name of ancestor area for Area 
Num_area is a number of terms, describing Area 
Synonym is a synonym for Area 
 
ontology_mult.txt structure: 
 
File_line::=Term’:’ Area 
Term::=String 
Area::=String 
 
Term denotes the ontology term, consisting of two or more words.  
Area is a name of area, described by Term 
 
ontology_one.txt structure: 
 
File_line::=Term’:’ Area 
Term::=String 
Area::=String 
 
Term denote the ontology term, consisting of single word.  
Area  is a name of area, described by Term 
 
For ontology implementation the computer security domain was chosen. For the testing purpose 
only the authorization area was processed. Authorization area contains the role-based access 
control, mandatory access control, discretionary access control and multilevel access control areas. 
Multilevel access control consists of Bel-Lapadula area. For formation of the ontology term sets, the 
following sources were used: [47], [48], [49]. The ontology object diagram is presented in Figure 
13.The content of ontology database can be found in Appendix B.  
 
     
Figure 13: Ontology object diagram 
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The knowledge base structure overview is given below in Figure 14. 
 
     
 
Figure 14: Knowledge base overview 
In order to prepare the knowledge base the following steps should be performed: 
 
1. Load stop words : phrases, words from stopwords_mult.txt, stopwords_one.txt 
2. Load prepositions: phrase, words from preposit_mult.txt, preposit_one.txt 
3. Load adverbs: phrases, words from adverb_mult.txt, adverb_one.txt 
4. Load not adverbs, ending with –ly from nonadverb_ly.txt 
5. Load data base from NLTK module 
6. Load ontology terms: phrases, words from ontology_mult.txt, ontology_one.txt 
7. Load ontology structure from ontology_structure.txt 
 
3.5.1.2 Area and footprint finding 
 
The area and footprint finding steps are implemented according to the description given in 
paragraphs 3.4.2 and 3.4.3, respectively. During the implementation these steps were united 
together for optimization of the finding process. 
 
In order to find areas and footprint the following steps are implemented: 
 
1. Make all letters to be lower-case 
2. Delete all end of line symbols ‘\n’ 
3. For every phrase in the list of ontology term phrases, check if it is in the document. If it is, then 
delete it from the document, and add to the list of document terms without stemming and to the 
footprint after stemming 
4.  For every phrase in the list of preposition phrases, check if it is in the document. If it is, then 
delete it from the document.  
5. For every phrase in the list of adverb phrases, check if it is in the document. If it is, then delete it 
from the document. 
6. For every phrase in the list of stop words phrases, check if it is in the document. If it is, then 
delete it from the document. 
7. Tokenize the reduced document. Tokens shouldn’t include any symbols or be the symbol. 
Composite adjective should be divided into 2 parts. No repetitions are allowed. 
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8. For every word in the list of ontology terms, check if it is in the token list. If it is, then delete it 
from the token, and add to the list of document terms without stemming and to the footprint after 
stemming, if it hasn’t been added before. 
9. For every token, check if it is in the list of preposition words. If it is, then delete it from the token 
list 
10. For every token, check if it is in the list of stopwords. If it is, then delete it from the token list 
11. For every token check if it is an adverb :  
a. Check if it is in the list of adverb words .If it is, then delete it from the token list 
b. Check if it ends with –ly. If it does and it is in the list with not adverbs words, ending with –ly, 
then add this token to the footprint after stemming . Delete token from the token list . 
12. For every token find its part of speech. 
13. Delete all tokens, except nouns, adjectives and verbs 
14. Make stemming for every token 
15. Delete repetitions in stemming token list and add them to the footprint list. Footprint is ready 
16. For every found ontology term find the areas it describes. 
17. For every found area ݄ܶ do following: 
Let ݐ݁ݎ݉ݏ்௛  be the number of founded in document terms describing the area ݄ܶ , and 
ܣ݈݈_ݐ݁ݎ݉ݏ்௛ be the number of ontology terms in term set, describing area ݄ܶ.  
 
Find ܧ ൌ ௧௘௥௠௦೅೓
஺௟௟_௧௘௥௠௦೅೓
  
    
If ܧ< 0.1, then document contents doesn’t related to the area ݄ܶ. Otherwise add its name to the 
list of document area names. 
 
Stemming, part of speech tagging and tokenization were performed by functions ݏݐ݁݉ሺሻ, ݌݋ݏ_ݐܽ݃ሺሻ, 
and ݓ݋ݎ݀_ݐ݋݇݁݊݅ݖ݁ሺሻ, respectively, implemented in NLTK module.      
 
 
3.5.1.3 Footprint comparison 
 
Footprint comparison was implemented exactly as it was described in paragraph 3.4.4. In order to 
encrypt footprint words and area names the Massey-Omura cryptosystem was applied. It was 
implemented in the following way: 
 
Key generation: 
 
1.  Bob generates public key ݍ, that is a random positive prime 1024 bit long number. 
2. Alice selects public key ݁ଵ , a random positive prime 256 bit long number and computes 
݀ଵ ൌ ݁ଵିଵ݉݋݀ ݍ െ 1. 
3. Alice selects public key ݁ଶ , a random positive prime 256 bit long number and computes  
݀ଶ ൌ ݁ଶିଵ݉݋݀ ݍ െ 1. 
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The usage of prime numbers as a public keys ݁ଵ, ݁ଶ guaranties that conditions ݃ܿ݀ሺ݁ଵ, ݍ െ 1ሻ ൌ 1 
and ݃ܿ݀ሺ݁ଶ, ݍ െ 1ሻ are met. For finding large prime number the function ݃݁ݐܲݎ݅݉݁ሺሻ from standard 
python module “number”, was used. To find ݀ଵ and ݀ଶ, the function ݅݊ݒ݁ݎݏ݁ሺሻ, containing in the 
same module, was utilize.  
 
Encryption: 
 
Let ݉  to be a number to be encrypted. Then encryption of ݉ will be calculated as ܿ ൌ  ݉݁݉݋݀ ݍ, 
where ݁ is Alice’s or Bob’s private key.  
 
Unfortunately, it wasn’t possible to use standard python function ݌݋ݓሺሻ for encryption, because it 
can’t operate with a numbers of such long size. So the new procedure was created. It calculates 
the modulus of the numbers of any length and is based on the modulus properties and function 
݌݋ݓሺሻ. The following modulus properties were used: 
 
1. If ܾ is odd, then ܽ௕݉݋݀ ܰ ൌ ሺܽ ݉݋݀ ܰ כ ܽ௕ିଵ݉݋݀ ܰሻ ݉݋݀ ܰ. 
2. If ܾ is even, then ܽ௕݉݋݀ ܰ ൌ ሺܽ
್
మ ݉݋݀ ܰሻଶ݉݋݀ ܰ 
 
The code of procedure for finding ܽ௕݉݋݀ ܰ, is presented below in Figure 15 
 
 
def large_modulus(a,b,N):  
 
    m=1 
    while b>0: 
        if not b%2==0: 
            m=m*a 
            m=pow(m,1,N) 
        b=b/2 
        a=pow(a*a,1,N) 
         
    return m 
Figure 15: Modulus finding procedure 
3.5.1.4 Result finding 
Since it is not always required to find the semantic relationship between documents, the area 
names comparison step is executed only when it is needed. Decision if semantic relationship 
finding is needed is made during the result finding step. 
 
Result finding step was implemented as it is described in paragraph 3.4.5. The area name 
comparison step is implemented according to the description given in paragraph 3.4.5 in Figure 10.  
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3.5.2 Method 2 implementation 
Method 2 was implemented according to the description given in paragraph 3.4. It has the same 
steps, as Method 1 has. They can be found in paragraph 3.5.1 in Figure 12.  These steps, except of 
footprint and area names comparison ones, are implemented in the same way as it were done for 
Method 1 (see paragraph 3.5.1). The description of footprint and area names comparison steps 
implementation is given below.   
 
3.5.2.1 Footprint comparison 
Footprint comparison was implemented according to the algorithm, given in Figure 8 in paragraph 
3.4.4.2. This algorithm is based on the usage of homomorphic encryption. In Method 2 Paillier’s 
cryptosystem was used. It was implemented as follows: 
 
Key generation  
1. Choose two 512 bit long prime numbers ݌ and ݍ 
2. Set ݊ ൌ ݌ · ݍ  
3. Set ݃ ൌ ݊ ൅ 1 
4. Consider ݊, ݃ as public parameters and ݌, ݍ as private ones. 
 
Encryption 
1.Let ݉ be a plaintext to be encrypted, where ݉ א Ժ௡כ   
2. Select a random 1023 bits long number ݎ 
3. Compute ciphertext ܿ ൌ ݃௠ · ݎ௡ ݉݋݀ ݊ଶ ൌ ሺ݃௠ ݉݋݀ ݊ଶ  ·  ݎ௡ ݉݋݀ ݊ଶሻ ݉݋݀ ݊ଶ 
 
Decryption 
1. Given ciphertext ܿ א Ժ௡మ
כ  
2. Compute plaintext ൌ ܮ൫ܿఒ ݉݋݀ ݊ଶ൯ · ቀܮ൫݃ఒ ݉݋݀ ݊ଶ൯ቁ
ିଵ
݉݋݀ ݊ , where ܮሺݑሻ ൌ ௨ିଵ
௡
 
and ߣ ൌ  ሺ௣ିଵሻ·ሺ௤ିଵሻ
ீ஼஽ሺ௣ିଵ,௤ିଵሻ
 
 
The functions, applied for prime numbers finding, calculating of the modulus of large numbers and 
multiplicative inverse to the modulus are the same as in Massey-Omura Cryptosystem 
implementation description in paragraph 3.5.5.3. Function ܩܥܦሺሻ  from standard python module 
“number” was used to find the great common divisor. 
 
In order to use Paillier’s cryptosystem, the modified private matching scheme was adapted. Instead 
of comparison of all elements the set at once, the set is divided into subsets, so that the 
multiplication of all elements in every subset is less than public key n. This is done to be sure that 
all coefficients are less than n and will be encrypted in a proper way. The number of common 
elements between two sets is a summation of number of common elements between each subset 
of one party and set of another party.   
 
The footprint comparison step was implemented in such way that while one party is finding the 
polynomial values, the other party finds the coefficient of the new polynomial and decrypts the 
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values of the previous one. The simultaneous performance of operations by parties reduces the 
execution time significantly.   
 
The overview of footprint comparison implementation step is given in Figure 16. The description of 
function for any two sets comparison is presented in Figure 17.  
 
Alice 
 
 Bob 
1. Find the words, that are in all Alice’s 
footprints and transform them into 
numerical representation to get set ܥ݋݉஺   
 
 1. Find the words, that are in all 
Bob’s footprints and transform 
them into numerical 
representation to get set ܥ݋݉஻  
 
For every Alice’s footprint ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺௜  repeat 
step 2: 
 For every Bob’s footprint ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻௝ 
repeat step 2: 
 
2. Transform the footprint words, that are 
not in ܥ݋݉஺ into numerical representation 
and add them to the set D݂݅ ஺݂௜  
 
 2. Transform the footprint 
words, that are not in ܥ݋݉஻ into 
numerical representation and 
add them to the set ܦ݂݅ ஻݂௝ 
3. Choose the parameters for a 
homomorphic encryption function ܧ݊ܿ 
 
  
Public encryption parameters 
 
For every set ܵ݁ݐܣ  in { ܥ݋݉஺  , D݂݅ ஺݂ଵ ,…, 
D݂݅ ஺݂ே } repeat steps 4: 
 
  
4. find the number of common 
elements between ܵ݁ݐܣ and every 
set from the {  ܥ݋݉஻   ,  ܦ݂݅ ஻݂ଵ ,…, 
ܦ݂݅ ஻݂௄}, according to the algorithm 
in Figure 17 
 3. help Alice to compare Alice’s 
setA and Bob’s set  
{  ܥ݋݉஻   ,  ܦ݂݅ ஻݂ଵ ,…, ܦ݂݅ ஻݂௄ }, 
according to the algorithm in 
Figure 17 
Figure 16: Method 2 footprint comparison implementation description 
 
Alice 
 
 Bob 
1.Start position ܵݐ ൌ 0 
 
 1.Receive ܧ݊ܿ_ܥ݋݂݁ 
2.Find the index ܧ݊݀  of ܵ݁ݐܣ  element, 
such that ݈݁ௌ௧ · … · ݈݁ா௡ௗ ൏ ܰ  and 
݈݁ௌ௧ · … · ݈݁ா௡ௗାଵ ൐ ܰ 
 
 For every element ݕ  in every set 
{ܵ݁ݐ஻ଵ, . . , ܵ݁ݐ஻௄},   do steps 2-3: 
3. Define polynomial ܲ  with set of 
coefficients ܥ݋݂݁  with roots 
݈݁ௌ௧, … , ݈݁ா௡ௗ 
 
 2. generate random number ݎ in range 
(5;35) 
4. Encrypt coefficients to get set 
ܧ݊ܿ_ܥ݋݂݁ 
 3. Find the  value of ܧ݊ܿሺݎ · ܲሺݕሻ ൅ 1ሻ 
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5.Send ܧ݊ܿ_ܥ݋݂݁  
 
 4. Send values Val 
6. If ܵݐ ൌ ܮ, do steps 7-10, else go to 
the step 11: 
 5. data =”more” 
7. Receive encrypted values of 
polynomial with coefficients 
ܽଵ, … , ܽௌ௧ିா௡ௗ form Bob 
 
 While data is not equal to ”done”, do steps 6-
7: 
8. send “done” to Bob 
 
 6.Receive data 
9.Decrypt values and count the 
number of 1’s for every Bob’s set 
separately 
 
 7. If data not =”done” do steps 8-10: 
10. Return the number of 1’s for 
every set 
 
 8.Receive C݋݂݁ 
11. for ݅ ൌ 0, ܭ ܰݑ݉_݋݊݁௜=0   9.For every element y in ݕ  in every set 
{ܵ݁ݐ஻ଵ, . . , ܵ݁ݐ஻௄} do step a-b: 
 
12. while ܧ݊݀ ് ܮ, repeat steps 13-23:  a. generate random number r in range 
(5;35) 
 
13. ܵݐ ൌ ܧ݊݀  b. Find the  value of  
ܧ݊ܿሺݎ · ܲሺݕሻ ൅ 1ሻ 
 
14.ܥ݋݂݁_݋݈݀ ൌ ܥ݋݂݁ 
 
 10. Send all values 
15. Find the new index ܧ݊݀ of ܵ݁ݐܣ 
element, such that ݈݁ௌ௧ · … · ݈݁ா௡ௗ ൏
ܰ and ݈݁ௌ௧ · … · ݈݁ா௡ௗାଵ ൐ ܰ 
 
  
16. Define polynomial ܲ with set of 
coefficients ܥ݋݂݁  with roots 
݈݁ௌ௧, … , ݈݁ா௡ௗ 
 
  
17. Encrypt coefficients to get 
ܧ݊ܿݎ_ܥ݋݂݁ 
  
18.Receive encrypted values of 
polynomial with coefficient ܥ݋݂݁_݋݈݀ 
  
15.send “more”   
15. send ܧ݊ܿݎ_ܥ݋݂݁   
16. Decrypt values of polynomial 
with coefficient ܥ݋݂݁_݋݈݀  and count 
the number of 1’s for every Bob’s 
set separately to get 
{݊ݑ݉଴, ݊ݑ݉ଵ, . . , ݊ݑ݉௄} 
  
19. ݅ ൌ 0, ܭ  ܰݑ݉௢௡௘೔ ൌ ܰݑ݉௢௡௘೔ ൅
݊ݑ݉௜ 
  
20. If ܧ݊݀ ൌ ܮ, do steps a-c, else go 
to the step 11 
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a. receive encrypted values of 
polynomial with coefficients 
ܥ݋݂݁ 
  
b. Decrypt values of polynomial 
with coefficient ܥ݋݂݁_݋݈݀  and 
count the number of 1’s for 
every Bob’s set separately to get 
{݊ݑ݉଴, ݊ݑ݉ଵ, . . , ݊ݑ݉௄} 
  
c. ݅ ൌ 0, ܭ ܰݑ݉௢௡௘೔ ൌ ܰݑ݉௢௡௘೔ ൅
݊ݑ݉௜ 
  
d. return ܰݑ݉_݋݊݁   
Figure 17: Sets comparison algorithm description  
 
The polynomial coefficients are found using the function find_coeff(). Its implementation is given in 
Figure 18 
 
def find_coeff(number_list): 
    n=len(number_list) 
    coeff=[0,0]      
 
    M1=[-1*number_list[0],1] 
    M2=[0,0] 
    for k in range(1,n): 
            M2=[-1*number_list[k],1]     
            for t in range(k+1):  
                coeff[t]=0  
            coeff.append(0) 
             
            for i in range(0,k+1): 
                for j in range(0,2): 
                    coeff[i+j]+=M1[i]*M2[j] 
 
            M1.append(0) 
 
            for t in range(k+2): 
                p=coeff[t] 
                M1[t]=p 
 
    return coeff 
Figure 18: find_coeff() function  implementation 
 
Let polynomial Pሺtሻ ൌ ሺxଵ െ tሻሺxଶ െ tሻ … ሺxL െ tሻ ൌ ∑ a୳t୳L୳ୀ଴  and N to be a public key of Pailier’s 
cryptosystem. Then value of expression ܧ݊ܿሺݎ · ܲሺݕሻ ൅ 1ሻ is found according to the following 
formula: 
ܧ݊ܿሺݎ · ܲሺݕሻ ൅ 1ሻ ൌ ܧ݊ܿ൫ܲሺݕሻ൯
௥
· ܧ݊ܿሺ1ሻ݉݋݀ ܰଶ, where 
ܧ݊ܿ൫ܲሺݕሻ൯ ൌ ቀ∏ ܧ݊ܿሺܽ௜ሻ௬
೔௅
௜ୀ଴ ݉݋݀ ܰ
ଶቁ ݉݋݀ ܰଶ and ܧ݊ܿሺ1ሻ ൌ ܧ݊ܿሺܽ௅ሻ 
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3.5.2.2 Area names comparison 
 
During the result finding the type of semantic relationship between documents may be required. 
The area names comparison is based on the algorithm described in Figure 11 in paragraph 3.4.5 
and the algorithm for sets comparison presented in Figure 17 in paragraph 3.5.2.1. The description 
of area names comparison algorithm implementation is given in Figure 19. 
 
Alice  Bob 
For every Alice’s  document repeat step 1-3:  For every Bob’s  document repeat 
step 1-2: 
1. Transform area names into numerical 
representation to get set ݄ܶ݁݉ ஺݁   
 
 1. Transform area names into 
numerical representation to get 
set ݄ܶ݁݉݁஻ 
2.Compare ݄ܶ݁݉ ஺݁   with every set 
{݄ܶ݁݉݁஻ଵ,…,݄ܶ݁݉݁஻௄}  to get the number 
of common area names according to 
algorithm in Figure 17 
 2. help Alice to compare  
݄ܶ݁݉ ஺݁  and sets  
{ ݄ܶ݁݉݁஻ଵ ,…, ݄ܶ݁݉݁஻௄ } 
according to the algorithm in 
Figure 17 
3.Return the number of common area names 
Figure 19: Method 2 area names comparison implementation description 
 
3.5.3 Non-privacy document similarity detection method implementation 
The algorithm for non-privacy document similarity detection, called non-privacy method, was 
implemented to find out in how many times the performance of methods for privacy-preserving 
document similarity detection will increase in comparison with non-privacy method. 
 
Non-privacy method has the same steps as Methods 1. They can be found in paragraph 3.5.1 in 
Figure 12. The only difference is that for comparison of footprints and area names secure protocol 
isn’t used. 
 
3.6 Testing 
Different experiments were executed to estimate performance and to check functionality of Method 
1 and Method 2. The description of the testing process is given in this chapter. The obtained results 
are interpreted in Discussion.    
 
3.6.1 Testing environment description 
CPU Intel Celeron (32bit) 2GHz, RAM 1GB 
OS Ubuntu Linux 10.04 
Python version 2.6.5 
Both peers were run on the same machine. 
For execution time calculation standard python function time() was used. Execution time was 
checked only for the peer who finds the type of document similarity. 
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3.6.2 Testing data 
41 articles were selected from ACM [50] and IEEE [51] digitals libraries. Their sizes varied between 
200 and 1000 words. Articles are related to the different areas, such as role-based access control, 
encryption, text mining, document similarity detection and so on.  
 
3.6.3 Method 1 performance measurement 
All experiments were done with aim to estimate performance and to check functionality.  The 
obtained results are given below. 
 
1. Since comparison execution time depends on the size of footprints, the series of tests were 
performed to compare footprint size with original document size. Their results are presented in 
Figure 20. 
 
 
 
Figure 20: Footprint size versus original document size 
 
 
2.  Another experiments were performed to measure the time required to find footprint depending 
on document size. Their results are presented in Figure 21. 
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Figure 21: Footprint finding execution time 
 
 
3.  The next experiments were done to compare Method 1 and Non-private method performances. 
The results are given in Figure 22. 
 
 
 
  
Figure 22: Method 1 performance versus Non-private method performances 
 
 
4. Also there were some experiments whose aim was to compare the execution time needed to find 
the type of similarity between duplicates and different documents with the same size of footprints as 
duplicates have. It was done to be sure that the Method 1 performance doesn’t depend on the type 
of document similarity. The results are represented in Figure 23. 
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Figure 23: Comparison of time required to detect the similarity type between duplicates and different 
documents 
 
5. Also some experments were performed to check if performance was improved because of 
dividing each footprint into two subsets (subset with the words, contains in every footprint of one 
party and the one with rest footprint words). This were done by the comparisson of the execution 
time, required to compare one Bob’s documents with several Alice’s documents at once or 
seperately for each document pair. The results are shown in Figure 24. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24: Comparison of time required to compare Bob's document with several Alice's documents at once 
or separately for each document pair. 
 
 
6. The aim of these experiments was to find out how the Method 1 performance increases if the 
number of documents of each party grows proportionally. The results are given in Figure 25 
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Figure 25: Method 1 performance versus the number of documents at each side. 
 
3.6.4 Method 2 performance measurement: 
 
1.  Several experiments were performed to measure Method 2 performance. The results are 
presented in Figure 26.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 26: Method 2 performance 
 
The execution time was unreasonable long therefore no more experiments were performed with the 
Method 2 
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3.6.5 Functionality validation 
In order to validate the methods functionality 41 articles were pairwise compared. The list of 
document pairs together with short description is given in Table 5. The obtained type of similarity is 
presented in Table 6. 
 
 
Number of  pair Expected type of similarity Articles description 
1  Different Both articles have the same topic. Authors 
analyzing the same articles. But they are written in 
absolutely different ways 
 
 
2 Different Both articles have the same topic. But their contents 
are different 
3 Semantically similar (since 
RBAC area is contained in 
ontology) 
The articles have the same structures across all 
documents. There are identical parts of text as well 
as rephrased ones. In the article the same RBAC 
system is discussed, but authors use different 
names for the system components. 
4 different Authors discuss absolutely different algorithms for 
duplicates finding  
5 Common part (because 
articles topic is not in 
ontology) 
The articles have the same author. The article [7] is 
a short version of [10].  
6 Different (since the 
common part is too short 
to detect any similarity) 
The abstract and little part in the introduction is 
identical. The rest of the documents are absolutely 
different. 
 
Other pairs Different All other articles are different.  
Table 5: Document pairs participating in functionality validation process 
 
Document pair Expected type of 
similarity 
Obtained type of 
similarity with ontology 
usage 
1 Different Common part 
2 Different Common part 
3 Semantically similar Semantically similar 
4 Different Common part 
5 Common part Common part 
6 Different  Different 
Other pairs Different Different 
Table 6: Obtained types of similarity 
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4 Discussion 
 
In a scope of this project the attempt were made to develop a method for identification of both 
syntactically and semantically similar documents in a privacy-preserving way. Documents are 
analysed using the ontology and main document subject areas are identified. Obtained subject 
areas are securely compared to determine semantic relationship between corresponding 
documents. Then documents are transformed into the sets of distinct meaningful words, called 
footprints and these sets are compared in privacy-preserving way. The type of similarity between 
two documents is determined according to the number of common words in footprints and 
documents semantic relationship The usage of the footprints but not the complete original 
document for documents comparison leads to the significant execution time reduction. But such 
approach has a drawback. It's not possible to determine if two compared documents are absolutely 
similar or one document was obtained from another one by making inessential changes, such as 
substitution of some words with synonyms, or changing the words order. To distinguish such cases, 
additional word-by-word comparison may be needed. As the area of application of document 
comparison tools (plagiarism detection and etc.) assumes that most of the documents are different, 
such additional word-by-word comparison step is needed rarely and thus doesn't lead to significant 
performance degradation.  
 
To transform the document into the footprint some Natural Language Processing techniques were 
applied. There are a lot of tools for NLP processing available, for example [40],[41],[42]. In this 
project the natural language toolkit [29] was used. It was chosen because it's distributed under 
open source license, has large knowledge base and good documentation. Unfortunately, it doesn’t 
always determine the part of speech correctly, therefore some additional measures were taken to 
guarantee that method works in a proper way.  
 
To find the documents subject areas the ontology was used. For this project only the ontology for 
authorization area of computer security domain was developed. But it can be easily extended with 
the other areas or domains. The main difference of this project ontology from the existing ones is 
that it is focused on the terms and what areas they describe, rather than on the areas of computer 
security domain and relations between them, as it is done in ontologies, described in [43], [44], [45], 
[46]. Real tool for the document comparison will use large ontology database and of course it will 
worsen the tool performance. But the subject area searching time can be reduced due to the fact 
that in a real use case the documents from the same domain most likely to be compared.  It doesn't 
take sense to use astrophysics ontology comparing the anatomy articles.  
 
Several approaches were considered for privacy-preserving footprints and subject areas 
comparison. They are vector space model, fingerprints and private-matching scheme. It was 
decided to use the private - matching scheme in this project. The vector space model was refused 
because it doesn't allow to detect the situation, when one document is a part of another one. The 
disadvantage of fingerprint approach is that it is very sensitive to the word order and, thus not 
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suitable for finding near duplicates. Such documents will be considered to be different. The private 
matching scheme doesn't have such disadvantages. It enables to identify all situations listed in 
paragraph 3.1. Also it is rather uncommon approach that has never been applied to the document 
comparison. It was interesting to evaluate its performance in such application. The drawback of 
private matching scheme is that it requires a lot of calculations in order to get the number of 
common words. 
 
 As the alternative way for secure comparison, original privacy preserving comparison protocol 
utilising the properties of commutative encryption, was designed. If each party has several 
documents for comparison than this protocol requires much less data transfers comparing with 
private-matching scheme. Additional time, consuming by calculation apart from the encryption, are 
not required. The method, based on this protocol, was expected to be rather fast and effective.  
As the result, two methods for privacy-preserving document similarity detection were designed, 
implemented and tested. The testing showed that Method 2, based on modified privacy-preserving 
scheme, is very slow and isn't suitable for documents comparison. Execution time grows very fast, 
because it is necessary to divide the footprint into different parts to be able to encrypt the 
coefficients correctly. Method 1, based on privacy-preserving data comparison protocol, shows a 
good performance. It was experimentally determined that its execution time depends on the size of 
footprints and the number of documents of each party and has linear growth. Also It was proved 
(Figure 24) that separate handling of the common part of the footprints significantly speeds up 
Method 1 execution.  
 
As for detecting of similarity types between documents, the Method1 has done it correctly, except 
of two cases. The first case was described in first paragraph of this chapter. The second case is 
following. When documents are from the same narrow area but contain different information, they 
considered as having common part. The reason of that is that the meaningful words are almost the 
same although they describe different things. To deal with it, the additional word-by-word 
comparison of documents is required. The wrong detection of similarity type showed that it is 
possible to apply this approach for privacy-preserving document clustering. 
 
In order to prevent the revealing of the document contents during the comparison process, two 
approaches were applied. Both modified private matching scheme and privacy-preserving data 
comparison protocol guarantee the privacy of the data transfers, if the parameters of cryptosystems, 
used in them, are chosen correctly. During the implementation of Paillier’s and Massey-Omura 
cryptosystems the size for public and private keys were selected in such way that the decryption of 
the transfer data will be practically useless. The developed methods don’t required the presence of 
third party but doesn’t guarantee the protection against man-in-the-middle attacks. So the secure 
connection should be established between peers. In order to provide privacy protection against 
malicious parties, the limitation for minimum footprint number was introduced.      
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5  Conclusion 
The goal of this project was to develop a method for privacy-preserving document similarity 
detection. It should identify either semantically or syntactically similar documents. As the result two 
methods were developed. Both of them have the following structure. At first, the areas the 
documents are related to are found. Then documents are transformed into the set of distinct 
meaningful words. These sets as well as documents subject areas are compared in a secure way. 
In the first method the original privacy-preserving data comparison protocol was used for secure 
comparison. In the second method the modified private-matching scheme was used for same 
purpose. Based on the comparison results the type of similarity between documents is identified. 
Both of the methods provide privacy protection for the documents content of the parties. 
 
Currently, based on testing results, the following types of document similarity are detected: near 
duplicates, one document is semantically or syntactically contained in another one, syntactically 
similar documents and different ones. In order to detect if two documents are syntactically similar or 
share the common part the additional word-by-word document comparison should be performed.  
 
During the testing phase the method, based on the modified private-matching scheme, showed that 
it is very slow and isn't suitable for the privacy-preserving document similarity detection. Another 
method, on the contrary, was found to have very good performance and can be used for creation of 
the tool for privacy-preserving document detection. But it needs some improvements, such as 
adding the extra comparison of all documents words when it might be required. More statistics 
should be accumulated to assure that the algorithm detects the document similarity types in a 
proper way. 
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Appendix A 
 
PoS database files contents 
 
Stopwords_mult.txt 
 
a's 
ain't 
aren't 
c'mon 
c's 
can't 
couldn't 
didn't 
doesn't 
don't 
hadn't 
hasn't 
haven't 
he's 
here's 
i'd 
i'll 
i'm 
i've 
isn't 
it'd 
it'll 
it's 
let's 
shouldn't 
t's 
that's 
there's 
they'd 
they'll 
they're 
they've 
thoroughly 
wasn't 
we'd 
we'll 
we're 
we've 
weren't 
what's 
where's 
who's 
won't 
wouldn't 
you'd 
you'll 
you're 
you've 
no one 
now nowadays 
out outside 
he'd 
he'll 
daren't 
co. 
e.g. 
inc. 
mayn't 
mightn't 
she'll 
she's 
that'll 
that've 
there'd 
there'll 
there're 
there've 
what'll 
what've 
who'd 
who'll 
how's 
when's 
why's 
et.al. 
proc. 
 
Stopwords_one.txt 
 
a 
ab 
able 
according 
allow 
allows 
although 
am 
an 
and 
another 
anybody 
anyhow 
anyone 
anything 
anyways 
appear 
appreciate 
appropriate 
are 
ask 
asking 
associated 
got 
gotten 
greetings 
h 
had 
happens 
has 
have 
having 
he 
hello 
help 
her 
hereafter 
hereby 
herein 
hereupon 
hers 
herself 
hi 
him 
himself 
his 
others 
ought 
our 
ours 
ourselves 
overall 
own 
p 
particular 
placed 
please 
possible 
provides 
q 
que 
qv 
r 
rd 
re 
regards 
s 
said 
same 
whereafter 
whereas 
whereby 
wherein 
whereupon 
wherever 
whether 
which 
while 
whither 
thereupon 
they 
think 
third 
thorough 
those 
though 
three 
thru 
thus 
took 
tried 
tries 
dost 
doth 
double 
dr 
dual 
due 
eb 
ec 
eu 
excepted 
exception 
exclude 
exclusive 
fa 
fae 
farther 
farthest 
ff 
found 
free 
front 
furthest 
gcn 
srd 
stave 
staves 
studies 
supposing 
ta 
tested 
thee 
thenceforth 
thereabout 
thereabouts 
thereof 
thereon 
thereto 
tho 
thou 
thy 
thyself 
time 
types 
unable 
upwards 
vol 
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available 
b 
be 
became 
become 
becomes 
becoming 
been 
being 
believe 
both 
brief 
c 
came 
can 
cannot 
cant 
cause 
causes 
certain 
changes 
co 
com 
come 
comes 
consider 
contain 
containing 
contains 
corresponding 
could 
course 
d 
described 
did 
different 
do 
does 
doing 
done 
downwards 
e 
each 
edu 
eg 
eight 
either 
else 
et 
etc 
everybody 
everyone 
everything 
hither 
howbeit 
i 
ie 
if 
ignored 
immediate 
inasmuch 
inc 
indeed 
indicate 
indicated 
indicates 
inner 
insofar 
is 
it 
its 
itself 
j 
k 
keep 
keeps 
kept 
know 
knows 
known 
l 
latter 
lest 
let 
liked 
look 
looking 
looks 
ltd 
m 
may 
me 
mean 
might 
moreover 
must 
my 
myself 
n 
name 
nd 
necessary 
need 
needs 
neither 
nevertheless 
saw 
say 
saying 
says 
second 
see 
seeing 
seem 
seemed 
seeming 
seems 
seen 
self 
selves 
sensible 
sent 
serious 
seven 
several 
shall 
she 
should 
six 
some 
somebody 
someone 
something 
sometime 
sorry 
specified 
specify 
specifying 
sub 
such 
sup 
sure 
t 
take 
taken 
tell 
tends 
th 
thank 
thanks 
thanx 
thats 
the 
their 
theirs 
them 
themselves 
thence 
thereafter 
try 
trying 
two 
u 
un 
unless 
unto 
us 
use 
used 
useful 
uses 
using 
uucp 
v 
value 
whole 
whose 
will 
willing 
wish 
wonder 
would 
x 
y 
you 
your 
yours 
yourself 
yourselves 
z 
zero 
item 
login 
ac 
ads 
ae 
af 
albeit 
asp 
author 
av 
baf 
bf 
biz 
ca 
canst 
cd 
cee 
cf 
cfm 
cfrd 
cgi 
general 
gif 
gm 
halves 
hast 
hath 
henceforth 
hereabouts 
hereto 
hindmost 
hitherto 
howsoever 
hr 
include 
included 
indoors 
insomuch 
investigated 
jpg 
kg 
kind 
km 
la 
low 
made 
meantime 
mr 
mrs 
ms 
net 
news 
nope 
nu 
obtained 
org 
page 
performance 
performed 
pl 
plenty 
post 
present 
presented 
presents 
provide 
provided 
related 
report 
required 
results 
roll 
sake 
sang 
week 
whatsoever 
whensoever 
whereabouts 
whereat 
wherefore 
wherefrom 
whereinto 
whereof 
whereon 
wheresoever 
whereto 
whereunto 
wherewith 
whew 
whichever 
whichsoever 
whilst 
whoa 
whomever 
whomsoever 
whosoever 
wilt 
wow 
www 
ye 
year 
yippee 
ble 
adj 
begin 
caption 
dare 
eighty 
end 
ending 
fewer 
half 
hundred 
make 
makes 
mine 
miss 
neverf 
neverless 
ninety 
recent 
someday 
taking 
thing 
things 
thirty 
undoing 
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ex 
example 
f 
few 
fifth 
five 
followed 
follows 
former 
four 
g 
get 
gets 
getting 
gives 
go 
goes 
going 
gone 
new 
nine 
nobody 
non 
none 
noone 
nor 
not 
nothing 
novel 
o 
oh 
ok 
okay 
old 
one 
ones 
or 
other 
thereby 
therefore 
therein 
theres 
various 
viz 
vs 
w 
want 
wants 
was 
way 
we 
welcome 
went 
were 
whatever 
whence 
whenever 
choose 
click 
cm 
conducted 
considered 
contrariwise 
cos 
crd 
cu 
cx 
date 
day 
describes 
designed 
determine 
determined 
dfe 
discussed 
dont 
save 
selected 
sfrd 
shalt 
show 
shows 
shown 
significant 
slept 
slew 
slung 
slunk 
smote 
sort 
spat 
spoke 
spoken 
sprang 
sprung 
al 
nt 
md 
pp 
1st 
2nd 
3d 
3rd 
4th 
5th 
6th 
7th 
8th 
9th 
10th 
0 
ps 
pc 
ca 
 
Preposit_mult.txt 
 
in time 
in the forefront of 
at the forefront of 
in demand 
on demand  
in focus 
out of focus 
in touch 
out of touch 
in sight 
within sight 
in a flash 
in a hurry 
in a mess 
in a sense 
in advance 
in agreement with 
in aid of 
in all likelihood 
in an instant 
in brief 
in bulk 
in common 
in comparison with 
in confinement 
in conjunction with 
in connection with 
in consequence of 
in contrast with 
in contrast to 
in disorder 
outside of 
once in a while 
of course 
side by side 
side to side 
so that 
very much 
during long time 
during short time 
for lack of 
for life 
for love 
for real 
for the good of 
for the sake of 
for want of 
in accordance with 
in addition to 
in case of 
inside of 
instead of 
in front of 
in lieu of 
in place of 
in point of 
in spite of 
in the end 
owing to 
on behalf of 
on sight 
on the double 
in return 
in reverse 
in short 
in succession 
in terms of 
in the aftermath 
in the balance 
in the case of 
in the course of 
in the event of 
in the extreme 
in the eyes of 
in the flesh 
in the form of 
in the habit of 
in the light of 
in the long run 
in the meantime 
in the name of 
in the open 
in the space of 
in the wake of 
in the way of 
in theory 
in time for 
in times of 
in tune with 
in turn 
in two minds 
in unison 
in vain 
to the detriment of 
to the exclusion of 
to the full 
under cover of 
under lock and key 
with a view to 
with an eye to 
with regard to 
with respect to 
with the exception of 
as far as 
ahead of 
according to 
along with 
as per 
as regards 
aside from 
as well as 
at the outset 
at the end 
at sight 
at the double 
at a time 
at a glance 
at a loss 
at a low ebb 
at a moment's notice 
at all costs 
at all events 
at any cost 
at any rate 
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in due course 
in earnest 
in effect 
in essence 
in excess of 
in exchange for 
in fact 
in favor of 
in full  
in gear 
in general 
in good faith 
in hand 
in harmony with 
in harmony 
in haste 
in hiding 
in line with 
in mind 
in moderation 
in name 
in spare time 
by virtue of 
by way of 
behind the scenes 
close to 
except for 
far from 
far away 
from the outset 
for a change 
for certain 
for sure 
for fear of 
for good 
for granted 
for hire 
over there 
on top of 
prior to 
pursuant to 
regardless of 
thanks to 
that of 
to the benefit 
where as 
with respect to 
a bit 
a lot 
how many 
how much 
how long 
how tall 
how high 
hardly ever 
next to 
in operation  
in opposition to 
in other words 
in particular 
in person 
in pieces 
in practice 
in preference to 
in principle 
in private 
in proportion to 
in proportion with 
in public 
in pursuit of 
in quantity 
in reality 
in recognition of 
in relation to 
in reply to 
in respect of 
in response to 
in retrospect 
in view of 
in words 
behind schedule 
on the air 
of the air 
on balance 
off balance 
on a regular basis 
on account of 
on average 
on condition that 
on display 
on the brink of 
on the dot 
on the edge of 
on the eve of 
on the grounds of 
on the horizon 
on the hour 
on the off-chance 
on the part of 
on the point of 
on the strength of 
on the stroke of 
on the way to 
on time 
on tiptoe 
out of print 
in print 
out of step 
in step 
out of date 
out of hand 
out of the question 
to the contrary 
on the contrary 
to an extent 
to date 
to excess 
at ease 
at large 
at least 
at length 
at most 
at once 
at one time 
at present 
at random 
at the beginning 
at the expense of 
at the foot of 
at the hands of 
at the height of 
at the latest 
at the mercy of 
at the peak of 
at the same time 
at the top of 
at this juncture 
at times 
because of 
by means of 
by chance 
by any chance 
by the name of 
by luck 
by accident 
by all accounts 
by all means 
by dint of 
by far 
by force 
by hand 
by heart 
by no means 
by oneself 
by sight 
by the side of 
 
Preposit_one.txt 
 
abaft 
aboard 
about 
above 
abroad 
absent 
across 
afore 
after 
against 
along 
around 
aside 
astride 
athwart 
atop 
ago 
apart 
away 
as 
at 
before 
beyond 
but 
because 
by 
behind 
concerning 
considering 
circa 
despite 
down 
during 
given 
hence 
into 
including 
in 
inside 
like 
minus 
mid 
midst 
near 
over 
on 
out 
past 
per 
plus 
pace 
pro 
qua 
regarding 
round 
to 
toward 
towards 
underneath 
unlike 
until 
up 
upon 
under 
versus 
via 
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alongside 
amid 
amidst 
among 
amongst 
anti 
apropos 
barring 
below 
beneath 
beside 
besides 
between 
betwixt 
except 
excepting 
excluding 
following 
failing 
for 
from 
next 
notwithstanding
of 
off 
onto 
opposite 
outside 
since 
sans 
than 
through 
throughout 
till 
times 
vice 
within 
worth 
withal 
with 
without 
 
Adverb_mult.txt 
arm-in-arm 
back-and-forth 
back-to-back 
both-ways 
counter-clockwise 
face-first 
feet-first 
forward-and-back 
hand-in-hand 
head-first 
head-to-toe 
just-so 
left-and-right 
left-to-right 
non-stop 
now-and-then 
now and then 
off-key 
off-tune 
right-and-left 
rightside-up 
right-to-left 
side-by-side 
side-to-side 
to-and-fro 
up-and-down 
upside-down 
right now 
 
Adverb_one.txt 
 
afterwards 
ahead 
almost 
aloud 
already 
also 
altogether 
always 
anew 
anymore 
anywhere 
askew 
aslant 
awry 
again 
agape 
alone 
amuck 
anyway 
askance 
awhile 
aback 
afresh 
all 
any 
back 
backward 
backwards 
beforehand 
bent 
 
better 
best 
clearer 
clockwise 
closer 
close 
deadpan 
deeper 
downward 
downstairs 
downtown 
doubtless 
earlier 
even 
evermore 
eastward 
elsewhere 
everywhere 
every 
ever 
enough 
far 
fast 
forever 
forth 
forward 
further 
furthermore 
hard 
harder 
headlong 
higher 
however 
here 
home 
how 
instead 
inward 
inwards 
just 
left 
less 
ladylike 
leftward 
lengthwise 
likewise 
lots 
louder 
lower 
last 
later 
little 
least 
more 
meanwhile 
much 
most 
maybe 
many 
never 
 
not 
now 
nowhere 
nearer 
nonetheless 
northward 
nearby 
no 
often 
once 
onward 
otherwise 
outward 
outwards 
overhead 
overmuch 
paler 
parallel 
partway 
pointblank 
pretty 
perhaps 
quicker 
quite 
rearward 
right 
red 
regardless 
rightward 
rather 
seldom 
sometimes 
somewhat 
somewhere 
soon 
sooner 
soonest 
sideways 
skyward 
slower 
soaked 
softer 
somehow 
southward 
still 
straight 
stupefied 
so 
then 
tomorrow 
too 
thrice 
tighter 
together 
twice 
there 
today 
tonight 
this 
that 
 
these 
upright 
unannounced 
unawares 
underfoot 
unseen 
upbeat 
upward 
underground 
upstairs 
very 
verbatim 
well 
westward 
withdrawn 
worrisome 
worse 
worst 
why 
when 
where 
who 
what 
whoever 
whom 
yesterday 
yet 
yeah 
yes 
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Non_adverb_ly.txt 
 
sully 
bully 
rely 
ally 
rally 
fly 
butterfly 
ply  
sly 
apply 
italy 
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Appendix B 
 
Ontology database files content 
 
Ontology_mult.txt 
 
enforcement of the security policy:authorization 
access control center:authorization 
access control service:authorization 
access control services:authorization 
access control mechanism:authorization 
protection of data:authorization 
access control mechanisms:authorization 
privilege management infrastructure:authorization 
role based access control:role-based access control 
dynamic separation of duty:role-based access control 
static separation of duty:role-based access control 
group of users:role-based access control 
groups of users:role-based access control 
role-based access control:role-based access control 
separation of duty:role-based access control 
rule-based security policy:role-based access control 
discretionary access control:discretionary access control 
identity-based access control:discretionary access control 
access control list:discretionary access control 
delegation of rights:discretionary access control 
access control matrix:discretionary access control 
mandatory access control:mandatory access control 
rule-based access control:mandatory access control 
policy of competence:mandatory access control 
military security policy:mandatory access control 
chinese wall policy:mandatory access control 
clark-wilson integrity model:mandatory access control 
clark wilson model:mandatory access control 
multilevel-secure computer system:multilevel security 
multi-level access control:multilevel security 
multilevel access control:multilevel security 
multilevel security mode:multilevel security 
security clearance level:bell-lapadula  
security classification level:bell-lapadula 
security clearance levels:bell-lapadula  
security classification levels:bell-lapadula 
rbac model:role-based access control 
access right:role-based access control 
access rights:role-based access control 
assigned role:role-based access control 
assigned roles:role-based access control 
core rbac:role-based access control 
constrained rbac:role-based access control 
consolidated rbac:role-based access control 
hierarchical rbac:role-based access control 
limited hierarchy:role-based access control 
limited hierarchies:role-based access control 
general hierarchy:role-based access control 
general hierarchies:role-based access control 
least privilege:role-based access control 
simple security property:bell-lapadula 
confidentiality service:authorization 
confidentiality services:authorization 
confidential policy:authorization 
data privacy:authorization 
access permission:authorization 
access permissions:authorization 
access privilege:authorization 
access privileges:authorization 
authorized entity:authorization 
authorized entities:authorization 
authorization process:authorization 
security clearance:authorization 
security policy:authorization 
security service:authorization 
security services:authorization 
secure state:authorization 
security violation:authorization 
sensitive information:authorization 
sensitive resources:authorization 
sensitive resource:authorization 
unauthorized access:authorization 
unauthorized manner:authorization 
unauthorized disclosure:authorization 
unauthorized use:authorization 
system resources:authorization 
system resource:authorization 
system entity:authorization 
limit access:authorization 
data security:authorization 
restrict access:authorization 
data protection:authorization 
protected status:authorization 
access control:authorization 
access mode:authorization 
privilege process:authorization 
access modes:authorization 
access right:authorization 
access rights:authorization 
multilevel security:authorization 
multilateral security:authorization 
dedicated security mode:authorization 
eligible to access:authorization 
denial of service:authorization 
mandatory access control:authorization 
role-based access control:authorization 
role based access control:authorization 
discretionary access control:authorization 
identity-based access control:authorization
rule-based access control:authorization 
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least privileges:role-based access control 
permission assignment:role-based access control 
user assignment:role-based access control 
biba model:mandatory access control 
biba's model:mandatory access control 
clark-wilson model:mandatory access control 
classified status:mandatory access control 
classification category:mandatory access control 
security labels:mandatory access control 
security label:mandatory access control 
clearance level:mandatory access control 
clearance levels:mandatory access control 
security clearance:mandatory access control 
classification level:mandatory access control 
classification levels:mandatory access control 
need-to-know model:mandatory access control 
access matrix:discretionary access control 
capability ticket:discretionary access control 
capability list:discretionary access control 
capability lists:discretionary access control 
dac model:discretionary access control 
need-to-know:mandatory access control 
attribute-based access control:authorization 
star-property:bell-lapadula 
ss-property:bell-lapadula 
ds-property:bell-lapadula 
bell-lapadula:bell-lapadula 
*-property:bell-lapadula 
top secret:multilevel security 
secure state:bell-lapadula 
confinement property:bell-lapadula  
simple-security condition:bell-lapadula 
security clearance:bell-lapadula 
top secret:bell-lapadula 
security classification:bell-lapadula 
security class:bell-lapadula 
tranquility property:bell-lapadula 
bell-lapadula:multilevel security 
need-to-know:multilevel security 
multilevel security:multilevel security 
multi-level security:multilevel security 
security level:multilevel security 
security clearance:multilevel security 
need-to-know model:multilevel security 
confidentiality policy:multilevel security 
 
 
Ontology_one.txt 
 
assign:role-based access control 
assigned:role-based access control 
constrain:role-based access control 
constrains:role-based access control 
hierarchy:role-based access control 
hierarchies:role-based access control 
operation:role-based access control 
operations:role-based access control 
permission:role-based access control 
permissions:role-based access control 
privilege:role-based access control 
privileges:role-based access control 
right:role-based access control 
rights:role-based access control 
classification:multilevel security 
secret:multilevel security 
confidential:multilevel security 
unclassified:multilevel security 
clearance:multilevel security 
dac:discretionary access control 
classification:mandatory access control 
classified:mandatory access control 
clearance:mandatory access control 
unclassified:mandatory access control 
mac:mandatory access control 
authorization:authorization 
authorize:authorization 
authorized:authorization 
authorizes:authorization 
grants:authorization 
identity:authorization 
mac:authorization 
object:authorization 
objects:authorization 
permission:authorization 
permissions:authorization 
permitted:authorization 
permit:authorization 
permits:authorization 
privilege:authorization 
privileges:authorization 
resources:authorization 
resource:authorization 
rbac:authorization 
subject:authorization 
subjects:authorization 
system:authorization 
user:authorization 
violation:authorization 
violate:authorization 
violated:authorization 
violates:authorization 
unauthorized:authorization 
confidentiality:bell-lapadula 
clearance:bell-lapadula 
secret:bell-lapadula 
confidential:bell-lapadula 
unclassified:bell-lapadula 
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authorizing:authorization 
confidentiality:authorization 
dac:authorization 
disclosure:authorization 
classification:bell-lapadula 
mls:authorization 
disclosed:authorization 
disclose:authorization 
 
 
Ontology_structure.txt 
 
authorization:authorization:89:access control 
role-based access control:authorization:39:rbac,role based access control 
discretionary access control:authorization:11:dac 
mandatory access control:authorization:25:mac 
multilevel security:authorization:18:mls 
bell-lapadula:multilevel security:24: 
 
